The State of Nature
by Jason Godesky“Bellum omnium contra omnes“–Hobbes’ “war of all, against all”–was the first word on the “state of nature.” It was a hypothetical then, a possible time when humans may have existed without government. Hobbes’ blatant stance against the very principle of empirical research ensured that this remained only a hypothesis, but he could hardly have tested it then even if he had been so inclined. Philosophers were only beginning to consider the possibility of the scientific method, and Hobbes was a strong proponent of the superiority of philosophical thought experiments. Anthropological data was only beginning, and even what little there was, was generally of the form of imperial apologia, describing the horror of barbaric pagan ways, and how desperately they needed the salvation of Christendom and European civilization. Hobbes’ “state of nature” owed much to Judeo-Christian mythology of the “Fall of Man,” and the inherent sinfulness of humanity. The individual human in the “state of nature” was, in Hobbes’ philosophy, a solitary predator whose cruelty was matched only by his cowardice. The result of such “anarchy,” in the traditional, perjorative sense of the word, was a life that was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Rousseau later challenged this idea, with his own ideas about the “state of nature.” Rousseau was impressed by the accounts of natives in Africa and the New World. Often, these accounts justified imperialism by casting European powers as a nurturing parent–placing natives in the role of innocent children. These accounts affected Rousseau deeply, and through him, all of Romanticism. The Romantics’ reverence for the native and the child are very closely linked, and for good historical reason. For Rousseau, “natural” humans were governed by natural pity and compassion. Life alone in the wilderness precluded all technology, speech or culture, leaving humans in a significantly keener, stronger, feral state. For Rousseau, the domestication of humans leads to weak people with atrophied senses and stunted intellect. Rousseau argues that human cruelty follows from the jealousy and inequality of society. In “The Origins of Inequality,” Rousseau described this “fall from grace” in terms of the invention of technology, private property, and the emergence of civilization. It is to Rousseau that we owe the concept of the “noble savage”–that uncivilized people are kinder, gentler, wiser, more enlightened and more noble than we.
These conflicting views still form the basis of our thinking about human nature. These are the two views with which we are most familiar. Hobbes sees people as bad; Rousseau sees people as good. Both were formed by Enlightenment philosophers as thought experiments, without any reference to what we actually know about “the state of nature.” Nearly all of that knowledge has been acquired since, so the fault does not lie with Hobbes or Rousseau. Given what they knew, their hypotheses were perfectly reasonable. Given what we know, continuing to base our concepts of “human nature” on these outmoded thought experiments so blatantly contradicted by the known facts, is completely irrational.
Perhaps the most basic error that both Hobbes and Rousseau commit is their inability to concieve of any society significantly unlike our own. Humans must once have been solitary animals, since there must have been a time before government, and how could humans live in groups without government? Given their miring in Creationist reasoning, that may even make some sense, but now we know that there has never been a time in the evolution of our species in which humans were solitary. We evolved from social primates, who evolved from other social mammals, going all the way back to the first organisms that discovered they increased their odds of thriving by working together. Many animals are well-adapted to a solitary life; humans are not on that list. We require societies to live, just as wolves do. Lone wolves are almost certain to die alone; so, too, a solitary human in the wilderness. Yet, as primordial as society is, government is a most recent innovation. We now know of many, many societies that function perfectly well without one.
Hobbes’ “bellum omnium contra omnes” is fictional, as well. We know now that such unrestrained violence is suicidal in the natural world. As Dawkins explained in The Selfish Gene, constant belligerence is most likely to lead to an early grave. Instead, conflict in nature only rarely ends in actual violence, as escalating displays of aggression give each side ample time to back down, before it comes to that. Plato first speculated that men acted morally only for fear of punishment, and this principle became the bedrock of Hobbes’ philosophy. While this may well be a common motivation today, it is now obvious that animals have restrained themselves and acted “morally” since the beginning of time–eons before the development of law, or the institution of punishment. This restraint came from simple evolution, and the fact that the alternative simply didn’t work.
Rousseau’s “noble savage” is also deeply flawed. Much of Rousseau’s picture of “the state of nature” came from imperialist propaganda. He failed to respect the sophistication and depth of native cultures. His “state of nature” also relied on a fanciful time before society, where humans were solitary. Most of all, however, Rousseau painted uncivilized people as innately superior to we civilized folk. What advantages they enjoyed were not innate, however, but systemic. If they were spared theft or murder, it was because their way of life made theft and murder meaningless–not because of their innate racial superiority. This “noble savage” myth is an insidious form of racism, where aboriginal peoples are dehumanized not by making them into demons, but by making them so simple that they are incapable of evil–and too innocent to be left to their own devices. It is a condescending fiction that turns grown adults into perpetual children.
The truth is not as simple as the question are people good or bad, as we so often put it. It is not as easy as Hobbes or Rousseau, because Hobbes and Rousseau are both wrong about the essential, inescapable fact of human nature. Namely, that humans are animals, pure and simple. We are not good. We are not evil. We are not angels or demons. As much as we may try to deny it, we are very much a part of this world. We are the product of evolution, and evolution bequeathed to us a system that is damnably hard to improve upon. If we find the world today is not to our liking, perhaps it would do us well to examine those cultural systems that evolution gave us, that worked for us so well for millions of years. I refuse to believe that striking bit of irrationality that of all the animals in the world, humans are unique twice–the only fallen animal, and the most exalted one. Our mythology talks of “the fall,” and makes us the worst of all animals. Or we can focus on our superior soul or intellect, and laud ourselves as the best. Neither is true, but those myths serve a purpose.
When we see problems in the world, like sickness, poverty, depression, stress, war, or pollution, we make no move to solve it. We chalk it up to “human nature.” We blame it on the myth of “the fall,” in one form or another, and move on. The myth keeps us from considering that those problems just might be solvable after all. Evolution does not create things so deeply flawed, so we invent stories to insist that we are. All so we don’t have to consider the possibility that we’re facing the systemic consequences of a single bad choice a few of our ancestors made 10,000 years ago.






A question for you - you argued that “The truth is not as simple as the question are people good or bad, as we so often put it. It is not as easy as Hobbes or Rousseau, because Hobbes and Rousseau are both wrong about the essential, inescapable fact of human nature. Namely, that humans are animals, pure and simple. We are not good. We are not evil.” Hobbes repeatedly stated in his Leviathan that “the desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from these Passions…” and ‘to this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.’ (Both from Chapter XIII) Hobbes was a thinly veiled athiest, so his comments are not just the product of logic in his work, but a central tenant of his thought. Good and evil are applied terms, and Hobbes was amongst the first to recognise this. Wondering what your comments on that are.
Also, just wanted to point out a pretty big internal contradiction in your argument (rambling). You accuse Rousseau of racism by romanticising the notion of primitive man as a ‘noble savage,’ which appears to just be a simple (and empty) attempt to discredit Rousseau. But then two paragraphs down, you argue that “…we can focus on our superior soul or intellect, and laud ourselves as the best. Neither is true…” I guess what I’m left wondering is, what’s your point? Are primitive men superior to civilised men because of their nearness to pure and successful anarchy, or are they just another form of bland humanity, that you seem to have a pretty bland understanding of. If they are as muddled as the rest of humanity, why do you care that Rousseau regards them as superior? Surely that’s a better ground to attack Rousseau on than his supposed racism. Finally, it’s important to note too, that both Hobbes and Rousseau avoided any mention of divine creation or ‘the fall,’ and their model of humans progressing through stages of growth closely resembles evolution (though the term had a while still to be invented in the scientific arena). So why do you get so up yourself about the fall? I can only assume its because you needed some logical bridge between the proposed subject (the State of Nature) and your desire to rant for a few paragraphs (which I feel justified in calling a rant, because you stop far short of reaching any conclusion other than conventional morality bores you). Let me know what you think.
Comment by Patrick Mulhern — 10 December 2005 @ 10:21 PM
According to Hobbes, human nature is a truly vile thing. Human cruelty is outweighed only by his cowardice. Yes, I’m quite aware of Hobbes’ atheism–as well as his cause against the scientific method in favor of pure thought experiment. However, his quibbling about the nature of “good” and “evil” as meaningless titles does not change the fact that his description of human nature is, in a word, “evil.”
The racism of the “noble savage” idea is quite well-known, but I did not invent it. Most people find out the “noble savage” is a racist, discredited idea before they even learn what the “noble savage” is. I have definite sympathies with Rousseau, because it is my own opinion that humans, being neither good nor evil, act in one fashion or the other due to the context they are placed in. Rousseau’s thinking was similar, but he saw human nature as “good,” and the effect of “society” as inherently negative. I differ from Rousseau in that I see the subject as more complex. Humans are neither good nor evil, and the effects of society can be either positive or negative, depending on whether those societies are adapted or maladapted to their circumstances. For example, the same impulse of “greed” in our society’s context is usually negative, but in primitive societies that very same impulse leads to the kind of actions we normally would consider “altruistic.”
This is why primitive societies are of such interest. They are obviously well-adapted to human nature, and the ecological conditions they exist in. Our own society can make no such claims. Thus, they are of interest as a guide to extrapolating what constitutes a well-adapted society, so that society’s effects can be positive, rather than negative.
However, romanticizing primitive societies as utopian as Rousseau did provides an unrealistic understanding, and thus undermines any such endeavor. Hobbesian pessimism that humans are inherently selfish and violent merely accepts the status quo and compromises for an inferior life subject to Leviathan’s literal reign of terror.
Though Rousseau’s ideas specifically had a significant role to play in the history of the idea of evolution, neither Hobbes’ nor Rousseau’s ideas could be considered in any way “evolutionary.” Yes, they divided history into stages, but then, so did Christianity itself, broadly, into the pre-Christian and Christian eras. For Hobbes, history shows the progress of humanity as we leave behind the bellum omnium contra omnes thanks to the ruthless violence of Leviathan. For Rousseau, history shows the regress of humanity from a solitary, Edenic state, to our current weak, corrupted form. Neither notion has the slightest to do with evolution (though both concepts of progress and regress are often attached to it by the ignorant). Evolution is about change–whether positive or negative is irrelevant, and thus, it is almost invariably a “mixed bag” of first one, and then the other. The history of evolution is littered with “failed experiments.”
Nowhere in any of the foregoing have I mentioned the work of Daniel Quinn, but if you were to identify my argument as “Quinnian,” you would be correct. Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau mention the Fall, but in both of their work, it is the “elephant in the parlor room.” Hobbes, though an atheist, espouses a view of humanity that is clearly based in the Christian idea of unsaved, sinful humanity. They are not terms Hobbes would use, but his depiction is indistinguishable from Christian homeschooling textbooks. Hobbes does not attribute “salvation” to any sacrificed godhead, though; instead, the State is humanity’s savior. It is a trivial difference in the overall arc of the story presented. For Rousseau, the Fall is a concept to rebel against.
The point of my “rant,” as should have been clear, is that “good” and “evil” are not inherent to our nature, but a product of our social context, which can be altered. Thus, if we find our situation not to our liking, then we cannot excuse inaction with invocations of “human nature.” Rather, it becomes our responsibility to create a society more to our liking. Perhaps I should have stated that more explicitly.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 11 December 2005 @ 2:32 AM