Thesis #1: Diversity is the primary good.
by Jason GodeskyHumans are social animals, and also capable of abstract, independent thought. The combination requires some form of social standards. Bees think with a single hive mind, and solitary animals do not encounter one another often enough to require a rigid system of morality and ethics. Without social norms, however, human society would break down. We have evolved in such societies, and require other humans to live. A single human, on his own, has little chance of survival.
Some rules are nearly universal, such as the injunction against murder. Society cannot long endure if everyone is murdering one another. Other taboos are less common; theft, for example, is generally found only in those societies where resources are limited in some regard. Rules of morality and ethics vary widely from culture to culture, adapted to given circumstances. Our ethics and morality are another means we have of adapting to new and different environments.
Basic rules of behavior are required for our survival, and conscience is an adaptation we have evolved to continue our existence. Such a conscience must at once be deeply felt, and culturally constructed. It must be adapted to those rules, taboos, and guidelines a given society requires in a given place and time, but be too deeply felt to be ignored. The human brain is incredibly malleable, made to be adapted to the cultural context it finds itself in. Enculturation is a powerful process which should never be underestimated. What you learn as a child can never be completely shaken; it becomes an inextricable part of who you are, as intrinsic to your being as your DNA.
As necessary as ethics may be, that does not make them correct. Nor does the depth of our conviction. I, like most Westerners, feel a very strong revulsion at the thought of pedophilia, for example. Yet, in the cultural context of the Etoro, the Marind-ani, and 10-20% of all Melanesian tribes, it is the only acceptable form of sex. While I cringe at the thought, I have no argument that it is “wrong” beyond my gut feeling of disgust–a result of my enculturation. As much as I prefer monogamous, heterosexual relationships, it was monogamous heterosexuals who committed the Holocaust. There is no similar act in Melanesian history.
The arbitrary nature of such ethical rules led many of our early ancestors to posit the final authority for such decrees with divine will. This is good and that is not because the gods said so, end of story. This made things nice, neat and easy. In the early days of polytheism, this worked nicely. Worshippers of Apollo and Ra alike could live in peace with one another. Most polytheists were willing to accept the gods of another as equally real as their own pantheon. Religious wars and intolerance were quite uncommon; after all, what’s one more god? Early religion was inextricably bound to politics, and so ancient states would enforce worship of the state gods–often including the emperor or king–alongside one’s own gods. Usually, this was not a problem; again, what’s one more god? Even monolatry–the worship of a single god, amidst the acknowledgement of many–was not much of a problem. Ra is my god and Apollo is yours, but we’re both worshipping the sun. I worship the ocean, and you worship the harvest, but both are equally real.
It was the emergence of monotheism that first posed a serious challenge. If only one god exists, then all other gods are false. If this is also combined with a charitable disposition towards the rest of mankind, crusades, missionaries, and other attempts to save the heathens from their error ensue. In a world where morality is determined by the will of the gods, such a conflict comes to a head.
If morality follows from divine will, are there no ethics for atheists? And what of the heathens? Yet, these individuals still have pangs of conscience as acute–and sometimes more–than their monotheistic cousins. This led to many philosophers trying to find some other basis for ethics, besides divine will. Such philosophies generally come in one of three types.
The first harks back to the old days of the divine will; deontological ethics focuses on duties we are required to either fulfill or refrain from. The seminal figure of this school is Immanuel Kant, who formulated the categorical imperative. Kant argued that an act is ethical if it could be done by everyone without breaking down society. This was later refined by Sir David Ross with his prima facie values–things that simply are good without question. Individual acts can then be judged by how well they comply to those values. The past fifty years have seen the re-emergence of “virtues,” as found in ancient philosophy. The four Stoic virtues of temperence, fortitude, justice and prudence work in a manner similar to Ross’s values–acts may be judged by how well they cling to these virtues.
Both of these systems share the same flaw as the ancient systems of ethics; they cannot exist apart from divine revelation. Even if there is such a god handing down such ethical systems, how can we ever be sure which of us has the “true” revelation? Every culture has different values, virtues, morals and ethics. Each believes that its way is the right way. Simply reiterating that position is not sufficient, and all claims to the superiority of one’s own scripture require one to first accept the superiority of one’s own scripture.
Unlike the foregoing systems, however, consequentialist ethics like John Stuart Mill’s theory of Utilitarianism do the best job of creating an ethical system independent of divine powers. Utilitarianism tries to maximize the utility–roughly, the “happiness”–of all parties involved. An action is “right” insofar as it makes everyone more satisfied, more happy, than they were before. This is not simple hedonism, as the welfare of all must be considered–your family, your friends, your society. Sitting at home tripping on acid is not an ethical action in Utilitarianism, for as much as it may raise your own utility, it carries with it a slight negative impact on everyone in the form of your support for a global network of drug dealers and smugglers connected to various forms of crime, oppression and terrorism.
Utilitarianism is often disparaged in philosophical circles, with counter-examples as the following. Take a thousand people, and some magical means of measuring utility numerically. One of them is extremely annoying. Killing him would drop his own utility from its current “100″ to zero, while raising everyone else’s from “100″ to “101.” That means that the overall effect of utility would be 999-100=899. Ergo, killing annoying people is a very good thing!
Obviously, Utilitarianism needs some other goal that mere “happiness,” but what? Once again, we run up against the wall of needing to decipher the divine will. Everyone has their own ideas, beliefs, dogmas and scriptures. How can we possibly know what the gods desire of us?
Perhaps one good start is to stop pouring over the texts they supposedly inspired, and instead look to the only thing we know for certain came from them (if they exist at all): the world around us. It turns out the universe has been screaming a single, consistent value at us from the beginning of time.
From a single, undifferentiated point of energy, the universe unfolded into hundreds of elements, millions of compounds, swirling galaxies and complexity beyond human comprehension. The universe has not simply become more complex; that is simply a side-effect of its drive towards greater diversity.
So, too, with evolution. We often speak of evolution couched in terms of progress and increasing complexity. There is, however, a baseline of simplicity. From there, diversity moves in all directions. If evolution inspired complexity, then all life would be multi-celled organisms of far greater complexity than us. Instead, most organisms are one-celled, simple bacteria–yet, staggeringly diverse. As organisms become more complex, they become less common. The graph is not a line moving upwards–it is a point expanding in all directions save one, where it is confined to a baseline of simplicity. From our perspective, we can mistake it for “progress” towards some complex goal, but this is an illusion. Evolution is about diversity.
Physics and biology speak in unison on this point; if there are gods, then the one thing they have always, consistently created is diversity. No two galaxies quite alike; no two stars in those galaxies quite alike; no two worlds orbiting those stars quite alike; no two species on those worlds quite alike; no two individuals in those species quite alike; no two cells in those individuals quite alike; no two molecules in those cells quite alike; no two atoms in those molecules quite alike. That is the pre-eminent truth of our world. That is the one bit of divine will that cannot be argued, because it is not mediated by any human author. It is all around us, etched in every living thing, every atom of our universe. The primacy of diversity is undeniable.
With that, we can suppose another form of consequentialist ethics, like Mill’s Utilitarianism, but with a different measure of “good.” It is not happiness, but diversity that should be our measure. Diversity of life, of thought, of action.
So, killing the annoying person becomes “bad”; as annoying as he is, he adds diversity to the group. Nor does this give license to everything under the cause of increasing diversity. Our own civilization is a unique data point, but its existence requires the expansion of its markets and influence. It gobbles up other cultures to create new customers. Though it is itself another point of diversity, it requires many other points to be sacrificed. Its overall effect, like sitting at home on acid, is profoundly negative.
You may recognize this as a very slightly modified double of my previous post, “The Primacy of Diversity.” It needed to be slightly reformatted to fit in with my new series, The Thirty Theses, which will be revisiting some of the older content in the Canon, but hopefully in a more complete, well-researched manner.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 19 July 2005 @ 10:02 AM
Put me in a room and add a physicist. Diversity has increased, and I would like to think that both the physicist and I would agree that this was good. If you put me and the physicist into a room, then later add a pedophiliac sexual predator and a violent XYY chromosome crack fiend, you’ll agree that diversity has indeed increased. However, I doubt the physicist and I would find the increased diversity to be “good”.
While I think that you have some really excellent insights into the nature of utilitarianism, I don’t think that “happiness” as a measure can be done away with; it seems to me that this would be like throwing the baby out with the bath water. I think that a happy medium between “happiness” and “diversity” would have to be struck. This new balance would make the previous reliance on vague utilitarian “happiness” obsolete.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 20 July 2005 @ 6:47 AM
I agree that diversity is a universal constant. It seems, though, that too much diversity *within* a group can be problematic. Diversity of species is key to a healthy ecosystem, but if you have too much diversity within a species itself, the animals can no longer mate and produce viable offspring. Likewise with cultural diversity: if you look at historical indigenous tribes, there was a huge diversity of tribes and cultures in any given area, but within the individual cultures themselves there was a lot more homogeneity. Of course each tribal member is a unique individual, but there is a certain amount of tribal customs which work to maintain good relations between members. It seems almost as though the rule is “Diversity without, happiness within.”
Roxy
Comment by Raku — 20 July 2005 @ 11:08 AM
Because neither increases diversity. Pedophiliac sexual predators abuse others, usually turning them into pedophiliac sexual predators, as well–or at least conforming them all into a single category of traumatized victims. Killers-llike your violent crack fiend–kill people. This diminishes diversity, as well. If the violent crack fiend kills you, the physicist, and the pedophiliac sexual predator, then diversity has decreased.
Roxy’s point is much more salient, I think. Is there a baseline of internal consistency that must be maintained, simply for creatures to interrelate to one another? How does this affect the overall principle?
It occurs to me now that sexual reprodution is merely one in a huge diversity of possible reproduction schemes; reproduction itself merely one in a huge diversity of options. To sexually reproduce, some amount of diversity must be sacrificed, but this is only one point in the utter diversity of the universe. So perhaps the principle remains, even so.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 22 July 2005 @ 12:16 PM
oh god….
Comment by Anonymous — 22 July 2005 @ 3:32 PM
“It occurs to me now that sexual reprodution is merely one in a huge diversity of possible reproduction schemes; reproduction itself merely one in a huge diversity of options. To sexually reproduce, some amount of diversity must be sacrificed, but this is only one point in the utter diversity of the universe. So perhaps the principle remains, even so.”
But if you had utter diversity, wouldn’t that be equally destructive? If no two individuals had any similarities at all, wouldn’t it make it extremely difficult and time-consuming to interact? There would be no species, no social organizations, only a world of unrelated individuals. I’m being extremist for effect, but I think the balance of diversity and similarity is an important consideration. Diversity is extremely important, but so is the establishment of some kind of common ground. Otherwise everyone’s just butting heads all the time. On a cultural level, the US is a great example of people sacrificing the good of the group for their individuality. Pedophilia works great for the Etoro, but if one Etoro decided to practice it, another one decided not to, a third did at certain times but not others, a fourth established his own elaborate rules for it… the social norms of the tribe would start to break down, and you’d have chaos.
Roxy
Comment by Raku — 22 July 2005 @ 4:58 PM
We can discuss the margins all we like, but the basic thesis still semms to hold up: Our world, and its survival, stems from diversity. To put my own spin on it, hierarchy destroys diversity–it may breed specialization, but this is simulacra because it is under the shadow of control of a singular hierarchy. Massive, integrated hierarchy as we’re seing intensify in a human-observable (vs. geological) time frame is an unproven evolutionary mutation, and is coming to the end of its rope.
Jason, any plans or a methodology to incorporate comments into your eventual 30 theses, or to let them continue to evolve?
Comment by Jeff — 22 July 2005 @ 7:40 PM
One of the primary stumbling blocks of utilitarianism has always been the narrow view people take of “utility.” Hey, shooting up on heroin is fun, so it must be good, right? Except that utilitarianism is supposed to take the wide view–in which, the deleterious consequences of you shooting up far outweigh your high, making it “bad.”
Likewise, I see this objection as one easily solved by the wide view.
Consider this set of 100 diverse individual entities, with no two sharing any traits in common. This set is, in fact, quite homogenous. Consider if, in addition to this set, we had another set, in which individuals had some traits in common, and other traits which were diverse. We have increased our diversity.
This nests recursively, as well. The superset of these two sets can be another point in an even larger superset. And this is, in fact, what we see in our own universe. The diversity of hydrogen atomic structures seems to resemble the infinite diversity you mention, which gives way to the homogeneity of the set of hydrogen atoms. No two atoms are exactly alike, but they are all alike in that regard, giving rise to a greater lack of diversity. But we can then introduce other sets–of atoms of other elements, and of molecules made up of those elements–which create still more diversity.
Going up a few levels, we see a huge diversity of single-celled organisms, as well as a small number of multi-cellular organisms with significantly less diversity. The process continues to recurse until practical limits of scale begin to kick in. I can count at least 11 levels of such nesting diversity: sub-atomic, atomic, molecular, chemical, structural, regional, planetary, solar, galactic, intergalactic, and universal.
So, I think the diversity scale in fact deals with your quandary rather nicely. Some amount of common ground allows for even more diversity; rather like sometimes, taking a step back can allow you to go forward a great deal more.
Jeff … no formalized process. The final, polished book should have a good deal more than is available free online, at least at first. So what I intend to do is write the theses first like this, then see what holes people bring up. When I go back to compile these into a book, I’ll likely add many of my comments back into the original article to address the concerns people raise. For example, I’ll probably add something here about diversity between individuals and groups, and how some common ground between individuals can yield greater overall diversity. And I’ll probably throw in some references to that mind-blowing first chapter of yours while I’m at it.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 22 July 2005 @ 11:11 PM
Jason -
Thought about your response to my response for an hour or so… I had thought of replying with, “Yeah, well the diversity wouldn’t immediately decrease, so there!” but realized that it would be facile and not really add anything to what was being discussed… however, I pursued the thought a while and came up with something I think you’ll really appreciate.
Roxy has a major aspect pinned down solid: diversity without, homogeneity within. Diversity is necessary to keep the universe healthy, and a certain level of homegeneity is necessary to keep a group healthy (and happy!). But is diversity the greatest good? No. Diversity is static. Diversity is a by-product. The greatest good needs a more specific definition, a more explicit one.
The greatest good is that which actively encourages diversity to increase. The greatest good is that which ensures that diversity remains dynamic. The antithesis of the greatest good is that which decreases diversity, the effects of which we all see.
If this was your original point, perhaps it was just not explicit enough for me. If not, well, ideas are refined in turmoil, as is survival capability. Let me know what you think.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 24 July 2005 @ 6:49 AM
Yes, that was what I was getting at. I suppose that needs to be made more explicit in the article.
“Diversity without, homogeneity within” is a bit too far-reaching, and seems rooted primarily in the myopia of our peculiar scale. Multi-cellular life needs some measure of homogeneity, but we find many populations of single celled organisms–as well as inert manner–in which there is truly infinite diversity. A new group with some homogeneity adds greater diversity, though. That innovation–like “breathing air”–ended up having far-reaching implications, and giving rise to a wide diversity of other options. However, as many and diverse as we multi-cellular organisms are, with our binding traits in common, are vastly outnumbered by the smaller, infinitely diverse, single-celled organisms in the universe, to say nothing of inert matter. As I’ll be getting to in thesis #2 (which I’ll be finishing up once I post this comment), this rise of complexity–which introduces the need for some amount of homogeneity, as you mention–is a result of increasing diversity.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 24 July 2005 @ 12:49 PM
Hey guys –
Some good stuff! On the ‘diversity without — homogeniety within’ issue…. might the missing key be social behavior? Jason, you talk about the massive diversity of single celled organisms, and the same may be true for, I dunno, clams for example. But when you introduce a species with social behaviors… mating rituals being the most basic, then a certain amount of homogeniety is required. When you compound that with species that actual live in social groups, then you need a little more. At the same time, it is something of a moot point in social group living animals, because from the materialist point of view, the FACT that they live socially will CAUSE them to have a shared understanding of the world….
Yes? No? Maybe?
Janene
Comment by Janene — 24 July 2005 @ 1:02 PM
More distinct groups = a healthier, more stable whole. Those groups that lose so much homogeneity that they can no longer reproduce themselves will simply cease to exist. Any argument about this is moot, as the ‘empty space’ they leave behind will simply be filled by other diversifying species/groups.
A constant increase in diversity (and action that encourages the same) is the greatest good, contributing the health and stability of the whole. Or something like that.
Comment by Chuck — 24 July 2005 @ 1:38 PM
Hey, Jason, you might want to check this out… It’s an article about how certain species of butterfly are being seen to diversify as a matter of existence.
“These wing colours apparently evolved as a sort of “team strip”, allowing butterflies to easily identify the species of a potential mate. This process, called “reinforcement”, prevents closely related species from interbreeding thus driving them further apart genetically and promoting speciation.”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4708459.stm
It related pretty closely to the topic, so I figured you may be interested.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 24 July 2005 @ 2:56 PM
Having mating behavior at all is one point in the spectrum of diversity at all; having mating at all is one point on the spectrum of diversity. Having societies at all is another point in the spectrum; not everything does. There are other means of reproduction, which require no homogeneity at all. Another point–sexual reproduction, rather than asexual–requires some homogeneity. Just another case of my previous point, that infinite diversity creates a group that is, in fact, homogenous. I think we’re getting caught up in the myopia of our scale; sexual reproduction and social interaction is so important to being human, we sometimes forget that neither is universal. In fact, it’s a tiny percentage of life that reproduces sexually; it’s an even tinier percentage that has any kind of society.
Consider a graph with points evenly scattered throughout. The graph as a whole is actually quite homogenous. Now imagine all the possible different graphs where points are clustered together; these are very different graphs. That’s another level of diversity. We’re on one graph that requires a lot of clumping, because that’s inherent to our complexity. But such homogeneity is no more crucial to this than complexity is the goal of evolution. We began with a baseline of simplicity; to diversify required some to become more complex, and complexity requires some degree of homogeneity.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 24 July 2005 @ 3:22 PM
Very true. To put it another way, consider if nothing in the world had anything in common with anything else. There is only one set, “Things.” This is actually a very homogenous set. There is only one level of diversity. If we have a yellow cushion, then we can never have a red cushion, or a blue cushion, or a polka-dot cushion.
If we add some degree of sameness, then we actually increase diversity. We have two sets: cushions, and not-cushions. Cushions can come in any variety of shapes, sizes and colors. We have a number of levels of diversity now.
Or finally, to put it mathematically, some infinities are bigger than others. Infinity minus one is still infinite, but it’s one smaller than just good ol’, regular infinity. A universe of perfect diversity could conceivably be infinite, but it would be a discrete infinite. A universe that allowed some amount of homogeneity could also be infinite, but every point within it would have within itself an infinite set of possible permutations as well, making it an analog infinite, with an infinity tucked between every two values. It’s a much bigger infinity.
Thus, the principle of “that which allows greater diversity is good,” holds, because allowing some things to resemble each other in some regard still increases diversity.
Nailed it. Exactly. That’s exactly what I was trying to drive at. I’ll be sure to make that more explicit in the re-write for the book.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 24 July 2005 @ 8:06 PM
“As much as I prefer monogamous, heterosexual relationships, it was monogamous heterosexuals who committed the Holocaust. There is no similar act in Melanesian history.”
What are you talking about? Did you actually read the article? They consistently commit “Holocausts”, they’re head-hunters… Even if this was not so, that line suggests heterosexual monogamy was somehow involved in the Holocaust which is ridiculous besides. This sounds like more “white guilt”. Why is it that people espousing egaltiarianism are so quick to immediately jump upon any incident any instance of institutionalized domination in western society but where this occurrs in “primitive” or foreign cultures we must “respect their diversity”? It’s hypocritical and mawkish at that, because you can be sure these groups would not be respecting our diversity. Placing an abstraction like “diversity” as an ethical good, let alone the highest good, outside the context of any specific system is absurd. Explain to me how ritualized pedophilia furthers man’s evolution in accords with the natural ecology. It doesn’t, it’s just a random cultural phenomena, and hardly an admirable one at that especially considering it’s purpose is to turn young men into killers, and I don’t see why I should be respect it. Some things are instinctively repulsive because they’re INSTINCTIVELY repulsive on a species level, not everything can be attributed to cultural relativism. If this group has managed to get young boys to “adjust” to this it’s not different than our civilization “adjusting” its members to all sorts of other unnatural and unhealthy behaviors.
Comment by ugh — 15 August 2005 @ 10:10 PM
I’d just like to add that it also seems to me, not only will people attempt to justify the practices of other cultures because they are foreign or primitive, but if there is a sexual component involved then it immediately becomes absovled of criticism. If it was just read an article about head-hunting tribes most likely there would be no quick defense of the group but because some kind of “sexuality” is involved we must stop and consider it. Why? Not all sexuality is “valid”, otherwise I’m going to post a link to sociobological articles claiming rape as an evolutionary adaptation and insist this is a valid practice for attaining cultural diversity.
Comment by ugh — 15 August 2005 @ 10:14 PM
This is hyperbole of such an absurd degree that I honestly can’t tell if it’s simply meaningless, over-the-top rhetoric, or if you actually believe that. Going with the (frightening) possibility that you actually meant that in earnest, the term “head hunter” is certainly a loaded one. It’s one of those myths we Europeans invented to justify the brutality of colonialism by demonizing our victims, as Giuli discusses in her review of Gustav Jahoda’s Images of Savages. They didn’t actually go out hunting for people’s heads. Being horticulturalists, they do have warfare. These “wars” can result in up to one or two fatalities. Those war dead have their heads taken off and shrunken. This helps instill fear in the enemy, which helps reduce the amount of conflict. Besides the fact that the Holocaust served no such beneficient purpose, there are two other enormous differences. Firstly, head hunters do not produce any additional dead; they simply take advantage of those already dead to prevent any further fatalities. Secondly, one or two is significantly less than six billion.
I ask that before you respond again, you please take a moment to understand the enormous differences in scale here and try to get a grip on some semblance of perspective.
If it does, it’s only what you bring to the table. What it highlights is that we are members of the single most evil culture to ever exist. Ours is the only culture to ever butcher people on such an unprecedented scale. There have been only eight mass extinctions in the history of the world, and one of them is being driven by our culture alone. Both in terms of its sheer scale, and in terms of how short its lifespan has been, our culture is the single most monumental failure in the history of the known universe. Nothing has ever failed more quickly or more absolutely. No culture has ever committed any act that can even remotely compare to the atrocities we have wrought.
What I am suggesting is that we are in no position to judge anyone, and not even for some mystical, moral reason. Simply that our culture is so permeated with this sick, twisted worldview, that it is impossible for us to even see clearly. As Jesus put it, “Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.” (Matthew 7:3)
What I am suggesting is that monogamous homosexual cultures have committed far more evil acts than pedophiliac heterosexual cultures, so how can we say that these, our moral superiors (by virtue only of being average compared to our abominable history) are wrong?
I don’t feel guilty in the least. I wasn’t involved in colonialism, imperialism, the conquest of the New World, slavery, apartheid, the Holocaust, or any of the other atrocities my culture has committed. I do understand what my culture is, what’s it’s done, and where it’s come from, though, so I know to never trust it, its values, or anything it holds dear. My ancestors were involved in such things, and while I’m ashamed of that, I certainly don’t feel guilty for it. Because I wasn’t involved. My entire adult life has been dedicated to fighting that horrific culture, the closest thing to absolute evil the world has ever seen. That’s not something to feel guilty about, that’s something to be proud of. And I am.
I don’t know, I’ve never felt any such urge. I routinely get myself into hot water with other, like-minded souls when I say things like, “The Iroquois weren’t all that nice.” I routinely point out that primitive cultures have failings of their own, most recently in the rather blatantly titled, “The Ugly Side of Tribalism.” So, I don’t know–it’s certainly not something I do.
No, they wouldn’t. My argument for a very long time has been that there is no ideological differences between us (see “The Ugly Side of Tribalism,” above). We all want to conquer the world. The difference is a geographical fluke that actually gave us the means to do it. The results have been nothing short of catastrophic.
Mmmm, how so? Anyway, I did set it into a specific system. My proposal is essential Utilitarianism, with a different center piece. That places it squarely in the realm of consequentialist ethics, a very well-developed realm of philosophy. Saying it’s “outside the context of any specific system” is like saying that Kant’s categorical imperative is underdeveloped.
Homosexuality occurs in most animals with an incidence of 10-15%. This amounts to a random culling in each generation, which keeps the overall population strong. In the case of the New Guinea highlands, we see one of the most densely populated areas in the primitive world. We know that in all animal populations, the incidence of homosexuality rises as a function of population. Pedophiliac homosexuality was glorified by the Greeks for similar reasons, to keep a good stock of virgins available for marriage. Plato’s Symposium is a long glorification of such man-boy love.
Habitual homosexuality thus keeps breeding to a minimum in an already overpopulated area. Breeding is restricted to a specific time of year which, like Abelam beliefs about yam spirits, help ensure that young are born in the season of maximal peace and prosperity, giving them several months to mature before the war season where there’s less food to go around.
OK, I need to break this up into parts, because the nonsense in the whole is too thick to tackle all at once. “It doesn’t, it’s just a random cultural phenomena,” well, it does, as I just explained. It’s not simply random, and what’s more, our own civilization began with similar cultural adaptations.
“[A]nd hardly an admirable one at that especially considering it’s purpose is to turn young men into killers…” You’re contradicting yourself. Is it random, or intended to turn young men into killers? Take your pick; if it turns young men into killers, then it has an ecological advantage and is not merely random. Or is it random, and has nothing to do with turning young men into killers? Also, by what mechanism does homosexual pedophilia turn a young man into a killer? My own thinking is that the warfare caused by competition over scarce resources would play a greater role, and that the warfare and the homosexual pedophilia are both seperate adaptations to the same pressure.
“I don’t see why I should be respect it.” No one’s asking you to. I don’t; the whole idea turns my stomach. But it certainly seems to work for them, whereas we haven’t found anything that works yet. You don’t need to respect them, but it does force us to drop a lot of our cultural preconceptions about the way the world is. A lot of the things we think are disgusting and wrong are not universal at all; they’re acculturation, and nothing more. Acculturation into the single most evil culture to ever exist, so everything it values should be heavily questioned.
Yes, we call them cultural universals. It’s a very small set. Incest is one of them. Homosexual pedophilia is not. So you are correct here–it’s just irrelevant to the current conversation. Far more common is culturally constructed disgust. We find things disgusting because our culture tells us they’re disgusting. Homosexual pedophilia is something we find disgusting because of the peculiarities of our own culture. It has nothing to do with objective morality, and nothing to do with instinctive repulsion on the species level. Actually, it’s relatively common…
Possibly, save in two regards: (1) they have been doing this for thousands of years, while our current lifestyle dates back all of a century, and (2) their adjustment hasn’t led them to wipe out all other cultures on earth, drive a planetary mass extinction, and change the global climate to the point where some are tempted to refer to the “Anthropocene.”
That’s because the only reason what offered up for “sexual immorality” boils down to “because I said so.” Usually by citing said argument from some kind of deity to lend it the semblance of reason, but even gods are capable of logical fallacy.
No, I think the same way about head-hunting. As I pointed out above, it’s largely mythological, at least in the way you seem to be talking about it.
Of course rape is an evolutionary adaptation. Just as it is an evolutionary adaptation to try to stop it. That’s why these things exist. But it’s not the sexual aspect of rape that’s so objectionable: it’s the violence. So this hardly speaks to any idea of what is or isn’t “valid” sexuality.
Let’s say you’re right, just for the sake of argument. Who decides what’s “valid” and what’s not? In the Middle Ages, canon law cited “natural law” to point out that all animals copulated only for reproduction, and each species had a specific position. So, they said that the only valid form of sexuality was missionary position with the man on top, and then only in the context of marriage, for the purpose of reproduction.
This was done from a European frame; they had not yet discovered the bonobo chimpanzee. Bonobos are the only species besides humans which do not have an estrus cycle. Neither human nor bonobo females are ever “in heat.” Bonobos–like humans–have recreational sex. Bonobos–like humans–have multiple sexual positions. Suddenly all the inferences of “natural law” that continue to underlay our ideas of “sexual morality” were tossed out the window. In fact, if we are to take from that example of “natural law” that most closely mirrors our own sexuality, then we should resolve all conflicts by mutual masturbation.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 16 August 2005 @ 11:15 AM
Er… um… eh… schmeh… quah…
I am confuzzled.
Comment by Giulianna Lamanna — 16 August 2005 @ 12:39 PM
That, there … is a typo. It should read:
Comment by Jason Godesky — 16 August 2005 @ 12:45 PM
That should also be “six million,” for the Holocaust death count, not “six billion.”
Comment by Jason Godesky — 16 August 2005 @ 12:47 PM
I thought that was the case.
Comment by Giulianna Lamanna — 16 August 2005 @ 12:47 PM
I should hope so. LOL
-_^
Comment by Giulianna Lamanna — 16 August 2005 @ 12:48 PM
“Take a thousand people, and some magical means of measuring utility numerically. One of them is extremely annoying. Killing him would drop his own utility from its current “100″ to zero, while raising everyone else’s from “100″ to “101.” That means that the overall effect of utility would be 999-100=899. Ergo, killing annoying people is a very good thing!”
Take a thousand people, and some magical means of measuring diversity numerically. One of them is extremely middle-of-the-road average of everyone else in the group. Killing him would raise the groups’ diversity (and in fact make the group even more diverse because my killing him would presumably make me slightly more different from the rest of the group - who, of course, haven’t killed him). That means that the overall effect of killing normal people is a good thing!
I’m sorry, but I really don’t see the appeal of saying that diversity is the only important good: Surely we want (for example) everyone to be more happy, not for them to all have different amounts in order to increase diversity? Generalising, there are certain things that we simply want more of, not more diversity in.
(Oh, and I’m also not sure that Kant’s ethics relies on an appeal to God - wouldn’t the Kantian simply say that good acts are those which can be consistantly universalised - there’s no appeal to either intuition or God here)
Alex
Comment by Alex Gregory — 29 October 2005 @ 12:58 PM
How would you have more diversity by taking away a relatively “normal” person? You’ll actually have less diversity because now you no longer have a really really normal, middle-of-the-road type person.
“Diversity” doesn’t mean “people who are unusual.”
Comment by Giulianna Lamanna — 29 October 2005 @ 1:29 PM
Kant’s ethics rely on an appeal to G-d because of the unspoken assumption inherent in it, that everyone should act the same way. Otherwise, why should the categorical imperative matter? That implies that there is some One Right Way for people to act. Maybe not a god per se, but certainly something in that ballpark.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 29 October 2005 @ 4:39 PM
Ok - I’ll rephrase. Imagine there’s a group with 3 very average middle of the road people (one of whom is me). If I murder one we lose no diversity, and gain some by gaining a murderer. To take another example, compare two groups of people, one where they’re all incredibly free, and another where they’re all identical to the first group except one is a slave. More diversity, but surely not morally better?
And Jason, I’m no Kant scholar but I think thats incorrect. Kant wants moral truths to be requirements of reason. Imagine you meet someone who asserts that 1+1=3 - most of us would say that he’s wrong, since reason dictates otherwise. Kant wants the same sort of thing to apply to how people act, so that they should act in agreement with certain logical truths. God is totally out of this picture - he grounds ethics in certain truths that he thinks people need to accept if they are to be logical at all.
Comment by Alex Gregory — 30 October 2005 @ 11:33 AM
A “murderer” doesn’t really add to a population’s diversity; it’s an artificial construct that turns a single act into defining characteristic. But at the same time, “average” is also a construct. It’s a point defined by a distribution; an infinitely small point. No one is average. Therefore, by killing someone–even someone who is very close to “average”–you are eliminating a point of diversity. At the same time, you haven’t changed, you’ve just committed an act. Therefore, you haven’t added any kind of diversity–you’ve only detracted from it.
If everyone in the first society is free, then there’s going to be a great deal of diversity in that group, because there’s nothing to keep their individual self-expression from flourishing. In the second society, if they’re all “identical,” then there’s only two points of diversity: the slave, and everyone else. The first group would make another point of diversity out of each individual.
In both cases, we essentially have a false dilemna created by creating a catch-all (in these two cases, creating a catch-all by a trick of language) to try to ignore the great diversity of one group, compared to the exaggerated diversity of a second group (where diversity is presented as more than it really is, again by a trick of language).
Sure, that’s the goal, but there’s no real reason for the categorical imperative. It is, itself, axiomatic. The categorical imperative cannot be proven as the arbiter of morality; it must be asserted. Maybe it’s not divine will; maybe we’re just supposed to take Kant’s word for it unquestioningly. But it still comes down to the same logical fallacy: bald assertion.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 30 October 2005 @ 7:49 PM
I think you need to give some definition of diversity that demonstrates why murder isn’t a form of expression and other acts are. Without such a definition you’re just going to say that any act which looks ‘bad’ isn’t ‘real’ expression and any act that looks ‘good’ is.
I think you also need to clarify /where/ diversity is valuable - in everything (trees, people, actions, etc.), just in people, just in actions, some combination of the above, or what?
Also, re:Kant, I’m sure he would argue that its no more bald assertion than the mathematician can only baldy assert that 1+1=2. That doesn’t necessarily vindicate it, but I think your objection needs work if its to be conclusive.
Thanks,
Alex
Comment by Alex Gregory — 31 October 2005 @ 4:05 AM
Murder most definitely is an expression; as is farting, eating breakfast, or buying a coat. But if a person commits a murder, that means she had the potential for murder beforehand; she hasn’t really changed. Just as she hasn’t changed much if she farts, eats breakfast, or buys a coat.
So, after a murder, we have less diversity among the population–we’ve lost one point in it–and the murderer hasn’t significantly changed, so she doesn’t add much to the diversity to replace what she’s taken. The overall impact on diversity is negative.
Everything.
What, it’s not bald assertion ’cause I say so?
Comment by Jason Godesky — 31 October 2005 @ 8:46 AM
Ok, so the actual act of murder doesn’t change much, because the potential was already there. Does the same argument apply elsewhere, so that, for example, people (e.g. scientists etc.) needn’t /actually/ intellectually explore the universe (by studying, reading, researching etc.), since the potential is already there, its a (morally) pointless exercise?
If diversity in everything is good, does that mean that (for example), me parking my car in a different space each day of the week is somehow morally praiseworthy? My car is adding to the diversity in the universe by varying its location.
On Kant again, I don’t quite understand your point. Kant is arguing something like (at least as far as I understand him) the following:
There are certain requirements of reason that we all accept, that 1+1=2, that ‘P and Q’ implies P, that we shouldn’t hold contradictory beliefs, and so on. One of these, he thinks we accept, is that any standard of behaviour we impose, we should be consistent and impose on everyone.
He’s trying to show that if you are to be rational at all, then you’ve got to be consistent in your actions as well as your beliefs.
Comment by Alex Gregory — 31 October 2005 @ 10:03 AM
A scientist who explores the universe does not add to the diversity of people, since the scientist herself is not very much changed by pursuing her own inclinations. I would say that science and knowledge are morally neutral–neither good nor evil necessarily. They neither necessarily add nor detract from diversity. Their application may be good or bad, but in and of themselves, both are neutral.
It’s still the same car, still in the same universe, and your parking spaces are not so far apart. So the diversity you’re adding is negligible, particularly in comparison to the diversity you’re detracting–creating more pollution that kills plants and wildlife, providing an economic impetus to pave over (i.e., homogenize) the landscape, etc.
Which implies a belief that any standard of behavior at all should be imposed across the entire human population. According to Quinn, even civilization would be OK if it weren’t for the fact that everyone was doing it. Really, there’s nothing that doesn’t become wrong under the categorical imperative. If everyone flushes their toilet at 9:26 AM, we’re all in for a world of shit. But that could never happen, and there’s nothing wrong with you flushing your toilet at 9:26 AM.
Yes, reason and logic have certain unprovable assumptions, like “P and Q implies P,” on which the whole system depends. Axioms. The categorical imperative is not immediately obvious as one of these. Kant asserts it as an axiom, but reason works perfectly well without it. But, by asserting it as an axiom, he must speak ex cathedra. He has no evidence for it; it’s an axiom, so it cannot be proven. In other words, bald assertion.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 31 October 2005 @ 10:21 AM
I think Alex has a couple of good points in there.
Just a couple of questions. Alex, how can humans be rational?
And Jason, I really disagree with your formulation of “action”. Are you somehow trying to mix free will with determinism? Because logically, free will doesn’t exist… by the very definition of logic. The whole thing gets really messy, however, when you debate how logical logic is. Using logic, of course.
So I’ve kinda given up on this, because it’s silly. One thing I read recently put it into perspective: “The mystery of life is not a problem to be solved, it is a reality to be experienced.” — from The Wisdom of Insecurity, by Alan Watts. (Highly recommended book, by the way.)
Comment by Devin — 31 October 2005 @ 10:31 AM
Okay… about murder and murderers… remember that scene in Batman Begins where Katie Holmes says, “It’s not who you are, but what you do that defines you”? And you’re all impressed by her profound wisdom until you remember that she’s carrying the unholy demon-spawn of a couch-dancing Scientologist?
What I’m thinking is, she was wrong. It is who you are that defines you. What you do is an expression of who you are, and doesn’t change who you are. So just because you committed a murder doesn’t mean you’re a fundamentally different person now than before you killed that person. You’re still the same person - you were always capable of murder - only now you up and did it.
When I go make toast in a few minutes, and then eat the toast, that will not change who I am. I was always capable of eating toast. (Well… almost always. Before I grew teeth, I couldn’t, but that’s not the point.) I do not add another point of diversity to a group by becoming a toast-eater.
That doesn’t mean, of course, that murder isn’t an action, or that intellectual exploration isn’t an action, so both are pointless exercises that have no effect on anything. They have an effect - they just don’t change the inherent nature of the person doing them. Does that make sense?
Comment by Giulianna Lamanna — 31 October 2005 @ 10:49 AM
Hey, Katie Holmes is hot! That makes up for all of her other shortcomings… and short husbands.
I don’t think you can separate someone from their actions… but then I don’t think you can separate that someone from the world around them either. Nor the world from the universe. And so on.
All-we-are is a manifestation of the universe as a whole. What is known as “identity” is a human construct, a concept that does not exist in reality. Our true nature is the nature of no self, and no non-self.
[/channel the-manifestation-that-is-called Thich Nhat Hanh]
Comment by Devin — 31 October 2005 @ 11:21 AM
That’s not at all what I’m suggesting. I’m just saying that a person who kills someone is not instantly a radically different person after the murder than he was before the murder. Therefore, the addition of “a murderer” in a group (i.e., the same person, only with a different label attached to them) isn’t a significant point of diversity.
Comment by Giulianna Lamanna — 31 October 2005 @ 11:57 AM
Which of these things, doesn’t belong?
‘1+1=2′ is a definition, certainly you can argue with it, but to what end. If we defined 1+1=#, or 1$1=2 mathematics still works, it just looks different to us.
‘P and Q implies P’ (or Q, how come we never imply Q?), is a consequence of the definition of the Operator ‘and’. As such, the only way to argue with it is to argue with the definition of ‘and’ which gives us the same issue as above.
‘We shouldn’t hold contradictory beliefs’? Says who? I want to reformulate this as ‘If two statements contradict one must be incorrect.’ This seems to be one of the basic axioms of logic and rationalist thought.
The above are all Axiomatic assertions. They are used to form the basis of a particular thought structure. The axioms are only asserted to be ‘true’ within that structure. If you want to argue against ‘1+1=2′ then you are now arguing outside of mathematics.
Kant’s categorical imperative is what Kant is trying to prove and therefore cannot be axiomatic.
Comment by JimFive — 31 October 2005 @ 12:10 PM
Kant’s categorical imperative is what Kant is trying to prove and therefore cannot be axiomatic
Thats an interesting argument - Did Riemann have to argue for his new axioms of geometry?
Ok, another try at a counter-example (not that I don’t think the others don’t work, but they’re not clear-cut). Presumably being in pain is a neglible change to diversity in the universe (perhaps even positive if you keep it varied) - does that mean torturing my partner regularly is morally ok?
Comment by Alex Gregory — 1 November 2005 @ 1:50 PM
No, but he wasn’t trying to prove those axioms, either. Kant’s argument is, “Assume A. Therefore, A.” It’s begging the question–that’s a logical fallacy. As a tautology, it is meaningless.
No, because regular torture would reduce the diversity of her feeling–she feels pain far too regularly. Scarring will reduce the diversity of her body tissues. Psychological trauma from such regular torture will reduce the diversity of her personal expression, and so forth.
At the same time, it does mean that there’s nothing morally wrong with experiencing pain from time to time, and that pain should be accepted as a regular part of life. That said, no one part of life should predominate one’s entire life–neither pain, nor joy. Both decrease diversity by becoming the primary experience. Rather, life should be accepted for what it is, both good and bad.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 1 November 2005 @ 2:14 PM
I prefer: We are what we [i]repeatly[/i] do.
Comment by JCamasto — 1 November 2005 @ 2:17 PM
Last comment I’ll make.
“No, because regular torture would reduce the diversity of her feeling–she feels pain far too regularly. Scarring will reduce the diversity of her body tissues. Psychological trauma from such regular torture will reduce the diversity of her personal expression, and so forth.”
Basically, it looks to me like your thinking of the conclusions that you want, and then redescribing the circumstances so as to fit what you want to be true with your theory. Needless to say, if thats what you want to do its not clear why the theory is there at all.
To demonstrate that; couldn’t someone use exactly the same arguments to demonstrate the opposite conclusion:
Yes, because regular torture would increase the diversity of her feeling–she feels painless far too reguarly without the torture. Scarring will increase the diversity of her body tissues (which are otherwise pretty uniform). Psychological trauma from such regular torture usually turns people into very wild and interesting people with unusual lives, and so forth.
As I say, I’ll leave it at that.
Alex
Comment by Alex Gregory — 4 November 2005 @ 9:01 AM
That’s the problem with any consequentialist ethics system: practically calculating the balance is very difficult, because, how deep do you go? You get the same troubles with utilitarianism.
Yet, consequentialist ethics are the only ones that get around the need for arbitrary principles like “duties,” so just because they make applied ethics hard in no way does that suggest that they’re untrue. Calculus is hard, too; that doesn’t mean it’s wrong.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 4 November 2005 @ 9:13 AM
In my opinion the attempt to establish diversity as the primary good diminishes the very quality being advocated. The very advantage of an empirically determined primary good would be the lack of diversity in ethical views. This is a case where diversity is not a “good�.
When you say “It turns out the universe has been screaming a single, consistent value at us from the beginning of time.� you are implying either that some consciousness caused or is controlling evolution or that evolution itself is conscious. When you say this value is the primary good you are assuming this consciousness to be both omniscient and benevolent.
It is only on faith that you can say that evolution has some purpose. If it has a purpose, unless we know that purpose, we can either say that complexity is just a by-product of diversity, or that diversity was necessary to achieve complexity. In either case we can say that diversity is necessary and therefore good for evolution.
The question of what the primary good is arises because a complex, life form with the ability to consciously affect its environment wants to know which causes are right and which are wrong. I don’t think you can empirically state that the primary good that should determine all human actions or choices is what is good for evolution. You can believe this but it is then you’re a priori statement. If we don’t know THE PURPOSE, then we, ourselves, must determine our purpose and take responsibility for it. For myself the primary good is to minimize suffering and strive to acquire the knowledge and wisdom to accomplish this for myself and all others. This is my a priori primary good. Everyone else is responsible for his or her own. I feel that a priori values are the responsibility of individuals and can only become general through consensus or oppression.
However I have found an interesting thesis that seems to make a valid empirical requirement that all ethical systems that guide individuals and societies are invalid unless they protect our ecosystem. I think it is very relevant to this discussion and I quote it in part:
“… all systems of ethical beliefs are hypotheses about how human beings can live on Earth. As such, they make factual claims. And like all factual claims, their truth or falsity depends on empirical evidence. For this reason, the sequence of biological events which the general statement of the tragedy of the commons describes is of decisive importance for ethical theory. It shows
(1) that moral behavior must be grounded in a knowledge of biology and ecology,
(2) that moral obligations must be empirically tested to attain necessary biological goals,
(3) that any system of moral practices is self-inconsistent when the behavior, which it either allows or makes morally obligatory, actually subverts the goal it seeks. Thus empirical criteria give a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for acceptable moral behavior. Regardless of the human proclivity to rationalize, any system of ethical beliefs is mistaken if its practice would cause the breakdown of the ecosystem which sustains the people who live by it. Indeed, biological necessity has a veto over moral behavior. Facts can refute moral beliefs.“*
.
* A General Statement of the Tragedy of the Commons by Herschel Elliott http://www.dieoff.com/page121.htm
Comment by Bob Harrison — 7 November 2005 @ 1:48 PM
Bob -
I had held the same opinion, because scientifically, you are absolutely correct; there is no scientific, empiric way to prove that diversity is the primary good. In the end, it’s all rhetoric and viewpoint, which are as mutable as the universe itself.
So why do I, personally, advocate the concept that diversity is the primary good? Consider the article http://anthropik.com/2005/10/why-people-starve. Cultural attitudes and beliefs have an extremely powerful effect on the behavior of humans, even taking them to their own deaths.
Holding a viewpoint that diversity is the primary good would naturally lead to actions that back up this view. These actions would be good not only for sustainability (and therefore allowing humans to survive indefinitely), but to allow humans to harmoniously integrate into the rest of life with a depth that has never before been accomplished.
With a belief that diversity is the primary good, humans could take it one step further to an understanding that that which actively increases diversity is therefore also good. Humans have the ability to help actively increase diversity, and thereby make the world better for all species involved.
Just my two cents.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 7 November 2005 @ 4:23 PM
Um, Bob… no offense good sir, but when you read your three statements in the end, it breaks down, practically speaking, as “preserve diversity.”
System change over time. You may have the most stable ecosystem in the world and then an ice age comes or a meteor strikes or a volcano explodes and the whole equation changes. The -only- way that life had dealt with this is through diversity, so that the weakest member (say, a ‘two-legged ape’ that took the weird and slower method of walking between trees instead of always swinging between them) has a chance under different conditions to thrive and establish a new equilibrium.
Since you cannot predict where or when this change will occur, your highest moral order must be to preserve diversity within the environment!
Comment by Bill Maxwell — 7 November 2005 @ 4:42 PM
Bill and Chuck:
I think our understanding of each other is being limited by our diverse opinions about what Jason means when he advocates diversity as the primary good in a system of consequential ethics.
No offense taken Bill, I’m just trying to understand and be understood. Any criticism is helpful. In my opinion Jason is advocating a system where all moral decisions are based on whether and to what extent the primary good is increased or decreased.
I agree that diversity is a good in many cases, especially in the number of existent species or the variety of things we recognize as food. As I stated before, unless a primary good can be empirically proven to be necessary, the choice of what you would use in your own consequential decisions is your own responsibility.
If we assume that the purpose of an ethical system is to guide human behavior, we can emperically prove that diversity as the primary good in a consequential system of ethics is ridiculous:
Humans and any other life form with the ability and the possible inclination to adversely affect the ecosystem and decrease the diversity of species should be exterminated. Since this act would result in increased biological diversity it is required by this ethical system. This ethical system becomes ridiculous, as now there is no human behavior to guide.
Comment by Bob Harrison — 8 November 2005 @ 2:31 PM
Humans and other destructive species shouldn’t be exterminated, as this would decrease diversity. Their behavior just needs to change so that it is not destructive, in whatever ways work best, therefore increasing diversity. Which is exactly what we are trying to do.
Comment by Raku — 8 November 2005 @ 3:14 PM
Raku: That was just a hypothesis. I don’t think humans should be exterminated. However even well-behaved humans have a larger footprint than most species so I thing the elimination of humans would allow for an increase in the diversity of species. Also since we always have the potential for mis-behavior our elimination would make the maintenace of maximum diversity more certain.
Comment by Bob Harrison — 8 November 2005 @ 3:57 PM
Bob,
We might have the potential for misbehavior, but so long as we lack the capacity, no harm done. And based on the evidence, it seems likely that this will be the case in the future.
And nothing is certain. You can’t determine that another destructive species wouldn’t eventually take our place, just as we can’t say that someone else wouldn’t have stepped up to lead Nazi Germany had Hitler died as a baby.
In the end, in my opinion, the biggest controls are physical. Everything reaches a balance eventually; it has to. Sometimes it just takes millenia instead of decades. And it seems that when we act like we know how to control and manipulate it, the worst stuff imaginable happens.
Comment by Raku — 8 November 2005 @ 4:53 PM
Ummmm, considering that most lifeforms are microbes wolves, rabbits, deer, and sequoias also have a larger footprint than most spieces. That alone is insufficent to merit the destruction of species. Ultimately that desicion should be left to the gods. However, one should remember that a large footprint isn’t by itself a bad thing. A deep and destructive footprint is. Hunter-Gatherers have a larger footprint than Americans, but it isn’t anywhere near as destructive. The point is that any action that actively diminishes diversity should be looked upon askance. Making up situations to say that diversity should not form the basis of an ethical system is much like philosophy 101 students arguing about the ethical guide don’t commit murder. Anyone here who took philosophy 101 probably knows what I mean. What does this system mean systemically. Anyone who would take an ethical system to the extent of trying to exterminate his own speices will be self-elminating, so let us consider the portion of society that would survive. They would not be as destructive or intolerant of other ideas, species, or peoples (except those bastards over there, they should die). This helps support the tribal ideal as it motivates enviromentally friendly practice and complements concensus well. Beyond that it would increase the life expectancy of our species by fostering the stability of the surrounding environment. I’m sorry, but I still fail to see what negatives this form of ehtics is likely to cause. Granted it needs some flushing out, but I see nothing inherently poorly considered here.
Comment by Benjamin Shender — 8 November 2005 @ 5:44 PM
Interesting article. I just stumbled on this website a few days ago, and have been curious about in the things I’ve seen here. I would like to offer a few comments on Thesis 1, although I haven’t read the comments yet, or the other theses, so forgive me if I’m a bit off track.
First, and briefly, I feel like the author’s account of utilitarianism is overly simplified. I’m not sure his example (about killing the one annoying person in a room of 1000) really succeeds. The relationship between various individuals’ level of “utility” is surely more complex than presented here (I lose 100, y’all collective gain 999..). Most utilitarians would presumably insist on a more nuanced method of calculating pleasures against pains. (For instance, killing the one annoying person might set a precedent that led to the killing of others. A consistent utilitarian would account for this in his initial calculation.) This is more of a quibble, I suppose, as I’m not a utilitarian. It just felt like the author was attacking a straw man.
Next, what I consider the interesting bit.
I agree with the idea that we discover valid moral rules by looking at the world around us. Hume famously claimed that you cannot move from statements about “what is” to those about “what ought to be,” and in attending to this proscription I feel that modern philosophers have often been led astray. I don’t know enough about Hume to criticize him more thoroughly; however, assuming that the author and I are on common ground on this issue, I would like to address two points.
1. The “diversity thesis.” While I think it is indisputable that diversity is a good, to call it the primary good is a very strong claim. The author’s argument appears to be that evolution and natural/physical processes unfold in such a way as to create diversity, thus diversity is the primary good. (I’m assuming the missing premise is something to the effect that “what happens naturally is the primary good.”) However, it seems that the word “good” naturally expresses a relation. That good is relative, in one sense, should not imply that it is not also, in another sense, absolute. What I mean is that if something is good, it is good for something. What, then, is diversity good for?
I’m sure that various objects of the good could be raised, e.g. good for living things, for animals, for human beings… Which of these is diversity good for? (I assume that others share my suspicion that it doesn’t make sense to talk about the good of inanimate objects, unless very metaphorically.) Ethics appears fundamentally to be considered with the good for human beings. Something may be great for trees, but if it’s not also in some way good for people, it is difficult to conceive how one would be motivated to help trees. Thus, I’m assuming “diversity is the primary good” extends to “…for human beings.” Now why on earth is that the case? The author (at least in the body article, I haven’t read the comments) doesn’t seem to offer any solution. And even if diversity is a human good, I can’t see how it could be the primary good: mustn’t it be a means to some further good (e.g. happiness)?
2. In not considering the relativity of the good, I think the author went astray at precisely the point when he could have argued for an empirically-based concept of human good. I would like to argue verrry briefly for an alternative conception. (a) Almost every component of a living thing exists to fulfil some function. For every bodily organ (for example), you can ask the question, “what is it for?” or “what is its purpose?” That is, the heart’s purpose is circulating blood, the purpose of which is to provide nutrients to our organs, whose purposes are to do such-and-such… One can keep asking “what for?” until one gets to the completed body. When one asks, “what is the purpose of arranging all these parts into this form?” the answer seems to be, “for living a certain kind of life.” (b) The “good life” seems to be a state of “living well.” (a) and (b) yeild (c ) By performing its function well, an organism leads a “good life.” I hope I have not gone too far afield here.
Thus, when addressing the notion of what the good life for a human being should be, one may legitimately ask whether humans have a “function,” broadly considered, and what it would look like for us to fulfill it. There’s plenty more that could be said about the idea of a good life, but I’m tired and have rambled on for far too long, and fear that I could go on much longer. I should say that the “function” argument above is ripped shamelessly from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, especially Book I. Much of my thoughts on the good these days are informed by this (admittedly dated!) work, and I would commend it to anyone interested in ethics or the human good. However, I’m intrigued by the ideas presented on this site, and hope I’m able to contribute to and benefit from discussion here.
Comment by David Eudaimon — 8 November 2005 @ 9:27 PM
Benjamin: I have not experienced Philosophy 101 nor have I any formal training in the subject. However such expertise is not necessary to show that the premise of Theses 1 is wrong. My persistence here is not because I don’t agree that diversity is an essential component of evolution and that the maintenance of biological diversity is an ethical requirement. I am new to this site, have learned much here, and don’t like to see this work flawed with this error.
Although I abhor the extinction of any species, I will respond with an analogy to the concept of leaving decisions to the gods:
Suppose you are a passenger on an airline, which is flying very erratically. Having no flying experience its best you not interfere with the pilot. That is provided you are certain there is one.
Comment by Bob Harrison — 10 November 2005 @ 6:10 PM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem
I can’t help but think you’re not acknowledging Hume’s dictum in your first thesis here. (In short: you can’t establish an ought from an is)
My email is heartwork@hotmail.com. I’m also “odb_fan” from ishcon. And I have a lil’ essay on moral relativism if you’d like to taste mah pain. (Zoolander reference, not a threat) That goes to everyone! heartwork@hotmail.com has the MAD essays! Tell your friends!
Comment by Adam Felton — 22 November 2005 @ 7:07 PM
Okay, I read the essay and the comments, and it still seems to me as if the whole “diversity” axiom - for that’s really what it is - hasn’t been questioned nearly as closely as it should have been.
Jason: you spend a few paragraphs pointing out that ethics based on divine will run into practical problems upon any attempt at implementation. Nicely done. You also spend time deconstructing the primary atheistic ethical systems: deontology and utilitarianism. Ultimately, they also wind up falling back on divine will, for the former depends on a priori axioms and the latter on presumptions as to what constitutes happiness, which results in another appeal to divine will.
But then you basically seem to pull your diversity axiom out of thin air. Several problems present themselves in your axiomatic presentation of diversity as the ultimate good. First of all, there is no unmediated truth. Even the most basic and fundamental scientific theories must by definition be mediated by human agents or they are not known to us. Science is no refuge from the egocentric predicament. Furthermore, your assertion that the universe seeks a state of maximal diversity presupposes a definition of diversity - a definition that is, of course, mediated by human expression and design, yours in this case. You also run into physics problems, more specifically, thermodynamics problems. What you perceive as “diversity” is really an inefficient distribution of energy that contains areas of high energy and areas of low energy. Current cosmological theory has the universe moving towards a uniform distribution of matter and energy, not away from this state, which would suggest that homogeneity, not diversity, is the ultimate goal. Finally, I would object to your seeming anthropomorphization of the universe as “driving” or “seeking” anything at all. Brute physical processes, which is your only option short of some form of theism, do not desire anything.
Unless, of course, you posit some kind of geist behind it all, which makes your whole theory some kind of modified Hegelianism. I submit that this is not an improvement over the outright theistic systems you discard.
Comment by ryan — 27 December 2005 @ 8:10 PM
It’s not much of an improvement, since I’m basically throwing up my hands and saying, “We need some kind of basic axiom to start from.” So, then I argue that the best “will of G-d” we can discern is diversity. I’m using “will of G-d” very loosely here. Whether it’s a thousand deities, a single Jewish god, or simply me anthropomorphizing the cold, impersonal, uncaring forces of raw physics, whatever made the universe what it is (consciously or not) certainly seems to tend towards diversity. That’s what we can get from the universe itself, and I think it’s the one clear, consistent message that the universe really sends. Now, interpret that as you will, whether it’s simply the logical result of impersonal forces, or the conscious desire of some anthropomorphic Creator, I’m going to use the shorthand, “the will of G-d.” And that, I think, is probably the best axiom we’re ever likely to come up with.
That said, Thesis #1 is one of the weaker ones … and not really all that crucial to what follows … so I may end up dropping this one when it comes time to write the book. You’re definitely right, I’m not really solving the problems I point out, I’m merely acceding to them.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 29 December 2005 @ 10:22 PM
Jason, stop pissing on your books. You’re supposed to be “poring,” not “pouring!!!”
Comment by ljr — 15 January 2006 @ 11:32 AM
Logic Smogic. What does logic have to do with reality?
“To take another example, compare two groups of people, one where they’re all incredibly free, and another where they’re all identical to the first group except one is a slave. More diversity, but surely not morally better?”
First I have to point out to Jason that the second group is identical TO THE FIRST with but one exception, not identical to itself with but one exception… And to Alex I say: I am involved in the BDSM scene and believe it or not there are people who desire to be slaves. They want to be absolved of any need to make decisions and of any responsibility. I say that while in general slavery is bad when imposed on those who are not inclined toward it, is it not equally wrong to deny someone who truly wants to be a slave and views it as a form of freedom (from decision making and responsibility) that right?
“he thinks we accept, is that any standard of behaviour we impose, we should be consistent and impose on everyone.” I also disagree on this one. As I said I am a BDSMer. I happen to LIKE being spanked. It relaxes me. And I have found someone who likes doing it to me. But I certainly would not espouse it as a standard of behavior for everyone. Nor for that matter do I want those who dislike spanking to impose their standard of behavior of not spanking on me. There is a major difference between failing to recognize that everyone else has the same rights I expect for myself and my group and saying that we have to impose a universal standard of behavior. One can have rights without exercising them, but to IMPOSE anything on another tramples on them. Again I say I would not impose my own standard of behavior of recieving spankings on everyone. Nor do I want them to impose their standard of not recieving them on me.
“- does that mean torturing my partner regularly is morally ok?” If that is what your partner needs to be able to be happy, then yes indeed it is. Get your culturally imposed belief system out of my life. Don’t judge something as morally wrong simply because it is wrong for you. I tried a vanilla relationship and destroyed a very good man because I couldn’t be happy in that setting. That was a greater moral wrong than my current partner regularly torturing me - with my enthusiastic agreement.
Logic is simply a tool. And like any tool it can be, and often is, misused.
As for the primary good. I would posit that species/group survival has underlaid all human moral systems. Any system which ensures the existence of our descendants unto the seventh generation (and presumably theirs unto the seventh generation, etc.) is a workable one. Those systems which do not safeguard this die out on their own. The problem with our current system is that we have a moral system which values having the best and the most for us and our children with no consideration of our great-grandchildren and how they will have the means to survive, much less generations which follow them.
Diversity and happiness are well and good as bases for morality so long as they include in their calculations the longitudinal element of species/group survival as well. Ecological diversity does indeed directly affect our descendants ability to survive. As does diversity within our species. Happiness on the other hand does not necessarily promote our ability to keep the species alive. But it is what makes life worthwhile for humans. And striving toward the hope for happiness gives us purpose and the desire to make more people.
Comment by ChandraShakti — 21 February 2006 @ 1:33 PM
“Any system which ensures the existence of our descendants unto the seventh generation (and presumably theirs unto the seventh generation, etc.) is a workable one.”
Workable over how long a time-table?
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 21 February 2006 @ 4:25 PM
How long do you need? Seems to me that it will be workable indefinitely.
Comment by ChandraShakti — 21 February 2006 @ 4:45 PM
Well, the seven-generation rule is workable for … seven generations. Might implode on the eighth, but who’s counting?
Everything is sustainable over some time period. Burning your house down for warmth is sustainable–for a few minutes, at least. The question is the time scale.
The “seventh-generation rule” is better than what we’re doing now, but still unsustainable compared to my own expectations.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 21 February 2006 @ 5:05 PM
Everything is sustainable over some time period. Burning your house down for warmth is sustainable–for a few minutes, at least. The question is the time scale.
The “seventh-generation rule” is better than what we’re doing now, but still unsustainable compared to my own expectations.
Jason:
Not to shave hairs, but what sort of sustainability are you wanting? As is said many times in Fight Club, on a long enough time-line, everyone’s survival rate drops to zero. Is your ideal of sustainability enough to last 10,000 years, 100,000 years, 1,000,000,000, 5,700,000,000 (until the sun dies)? Longer?
How do you quantify it? Knowing what you mean by sustainable could help people to understand your writings. You do talk an awful lot about how the socieities that survive are sustainable (almost a tautology), but what if YOUR level of sustainability?
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 21 February 2006 @ 5:24 PM
I try to avoid the word “sustainability” for precisely that reason–you’ll see it crops up mainly in the comments, just like “natural.”
But, let’s put it this way … if the rate at which you consume a resources is lower than the rate at which that resources regenerates, then you are using that resources sustainably. If you are using all the resoures that you require sustainably, then you are sustainable. No generations–seventh, eighth or otherwise–need be consulted.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 21 February 2006 @ 5:27 PM
Hey –
I tend to think of ’sustainable’ as leaving the environment the same as, or preferably ‘healthier than’ what it was when you arrived.
That can be hard to quantify in a lot of cases, but on the other side, if you are looking for signs of degradation in your home environment, its usually pretty easy to spot. So if the environment is degrading around you, then something you are doing is unsustainable.
And maybe, really, that is the best way to approach it, because a group may do X for seven generations without any problem, but then something in the environment changes (weather, a new species, a declining species, whatever) and all of a sudden the helath of the system is declining. Might be a good time to consider what actions might be contributing to the decline and what alternate options may be better…
Janene
Comment by Janene — 21 February 2006 @ 5:30 PM
I have a suspicion that the seventh generation rule has less to do with sustainability than it does with the transmission of cultural memes.
Seven generations is about the time is takes for no one to have had first-hand contact with the first generation. Also, by that amount of time, things in your landscape have probably changed. Not dramatically or maybe very dramatically but they will have changed.
So the rule is more “the future’s going to be different. Don’t assume they’re going to do it the same way you’re going to do it.” It also brings things back into an immediate context, planning for your family while also having the unspoken assumption that your line will contine.
Takers on the other hand seem to have a “plan for the X generation” kind of mentality, that is that someday, some child will figure out how to take care of all the fuck-ups they’ve done before.
Well, they were right. We have figured it out.
Walk away.
Best
Bill Maxwell
Comment by Bill Maxwell — 21 February 2006 @ 5:39 PM
“But, let’s put it this way … if the rate at which you consume a resources is lower than the rate at which that resources regenerates, then you are using that resources sustainably.”
So what do we do when the Earth stops producing new rock? Do we stop using stone tools?
On a long enough timeline, everyone’s survival rate drops to zero.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 21 February 2006 @ 5:43 PM
I … suppose so, but that can’t really happen, geologically, I don’t think….
Comment by Jason Godesky — 21 February 2006 @ 5:44 PM
“I … suppose so, but that can’t really happen, geologically, I don’t think….”
The crust, mantle, and core of Earth contain varying amounts of radioactive elements, the most important for heat production being Uranium-238, Uranium-235, Thorium-232, and Potassium-40, with half-lives of roughly 4.47 billion years, 704 million years, 14.1 billion years, and 1.28 billion years, respectively. From the half-lives of these isotopes and a comparison with the age of Earth, you can see that internal heat production via radioactive decay will likely persist at near current levels for quite some time to come.
I hope you don’t think I’m doing this to split hairs; I’m really very curious! In my opinion, saying, “Well, by the time the Earth cools down, it’ll no longer be my concern,” is no different than saying, “Well, I’ll be dead by 2050, so we may as well let our kids deal with it.”
Both are, I think, selfish, but unfortunately I find the former statement as a subtext all over the place in the primitivist movement. While they’re questions that are far reaching in their connotations and implications, I think it is no bad thing to ask the questions now. Who knows what insights could come from it?
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 21 February 2006 @ 5:54 PM
True, but the better question is, is there anything we can do about it? If not, then I can’t see much point in worrying about it. Eventually the sun will die, too, but all good things must come to an end. Dying off because the earth dies, or the sun goes nova, or whatever cosmic powers may finally end all life on earth is one thing; killing ourselves with a way of life that’s so intensely suicidal and psychotic is another thing entirely.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 21 February 2006 @ 5:59 PM
Fair enough. That’s a good point.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 21 February 2006 @ 6:20 PM
“Well, the seven-generation rule is workable for … seven generations. Might implode on the eighth, but who’s counting?” Not so. Because each generation is thinking seven generations into the future. So while the way things are done by the first generation might indeed lead to implosion in the eighth generation if continued. That eighth would become the seventh generation for the second who would need to institute changes to keep the implosion from happening. That gives approximately a 150 year window to correct problems created by the first generation’s way of doing things. It is far more workable than our current system. The dangers of our current were clearly seen over a generation ago, but effective action was not taken at that time and now it would seem that in all likelyhood we have less than a generation left before collapse of the system. If greater changes were instituted in the 50’s and 60’s when the problems were becoming undeniable the situation would not be as dire now.
And as was pointed out by Bill, the seventh generation rule of thumb also allows for cultural change and adaptation to new conditions. In fact, I suspect, it requires it.
Comment by ChandraShakti — 22 February 2006 @ 2:47 PM
An improvement over “the next quarter,” to be sure, but what about the problems that take 151 years to solve? Expanding the window of one’s short-term thinking is not the solution here.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 22 February 2006 @ 2:52 PM
I have had time to digest and process this now. The whole seventh generation thing is a red herring. It was meant as an example. My point was that human morality is based on the survival of the human species and particularly on the continuation of ones own line into the indefinite future. But, you are right Jason, in order to do that holding diversity as a prime value is vital. Though when it comes right down to it, where I see a conflict between preserving / enhancing diversity and the survival of my line, I know I will go with survival of my line. That, perhaps is not right, but it is what I will do when push comes to shove.
Comment by ChandraShakti — 24 February 2006 @ 11:51 AM
Jason Godesky wrote:
Plato’s Symposium is a long glorification of such man-boy love.
According to my limited grasp of Ancient Greek language and culture, that is wrong. Plato is not around: we can’t appeal to him to explain exactly what he meant. The conventional reading is that Plato acknowledged homosexuality as prevalent but sought to eliminate it from society. The conventional reading is that Plato was anti-gay. If you want to claim that Plato was pro-gay and convince homosexuals, you don’t need to publish anything. If you want to claim in Greek studies journals that Plato was pro-gay, you’ve got a very difficult scholarly job.
Emotions run high for both the pro-gay and anti-gay writers who want to claim Plato as a figurehead of their respective movements. My own position is that whenever sex crops up in Plato’s writings, the primary meaning is that Plato is preaching against sex, in favor of the development of non-sexual mental faculties. You can take a Greek text like Alcibiades and translate it into two widely divergent English versions — pro-gay and anti-gay. But you can’t baldly claim that Plato is pro-gay or even pro-same-sex-genital-contact and expect the average Hellenist to accept it.
If Jason wants to push that point in his book, he should expect scholarly resistance from professors of Ancient Greek. On the other hand, he can count on the support of certain homosexual propagandists.
This claim is not central to Jason’s 30 theses: he can omit it without great consequence. I suggest that he should weigh the importance of professors to his overall audience.
As for the “all animal populations exhibit 10% homosexuality,” I have zero training in animal behavior, but I won’t believe it until I see credible scientists making the claim in print.
Comment by Rick — 31 March 2006 @ 8:40 PM
Rick check out Evolution’s Rainbow : Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People by Joan Roughgarden.
Comment by ChandraShakti — 1 April 2006 @ 6:53 PM
There is no consensus about the extent of same-sex behavior. Roughgarden draws on Bruce Bagemihl’s 1999 book, Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity, which reports homosexual behavior in some 450 species. But like many researchers, Paul Vasey, a University of Lethbridge (Alberta) psychologist who has spent 12 years studying sexual behavior in Japanese macaques, believes homosexuality is “not as widespread as has been publicized.� While he’s documented “a vast amount of sexual diversity� in the macaques, including long-term sexual relationships between females, Vasey doesn’t think their behavior is typical of other species. “I believe that homosexuality has been observed in a few hundred species, but that doesn’t mean that homosexuality is frequent,� he says. “Based on available data, Darwin’s theory needs to be modified, not abandoned.�
http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2004/mayjun/features/roughgarden.html
Roughgarden might indeed turn out to be right … or she may turn out to be wrong. Presently there is not enough confirmation for me to say that 10% of all animals are homosexual. (And if civilization collapses in 2010, there probably never will be.)
Other pages mention that Roughgarden cites Bagemihl. Bagemihl has a great many non-scientist advocates citing him, and no scientific citations that I can find.
On the one hand, animal same-sex genital contact can be readily observed. The question of whether it is observed in a representative sample, however, seems to be open. Certainly 10% of all animal life is a very broad statement: if one is going to back that up, one needs more than just two scientists. And from Bagemihl’s findings, it is reasonable to suppose that it is not a blanket 10% ratio, but a different ratio for every species. (The blanket 10% figure can be criticized not unlike Reason’s criticism of the Hopfenberg: an oversimplified global estimate can lose important information on the real phenomena.)
It may very well turn out that a representative sample of wildlife *would* exhibit species-specific percentages of same-sex genital contact. Science *does* frequently malfunction: very often scientific professions *do* cover up embarrassing data. So I likewise suspend judgement on Bagemihl.
In this matter of animal biology, as with the matter of ecological science, I strongly urge the tribe of Anthropik to moderate their confidence. I don’t believe the science is nearly as simple as you say. (Further, even your non-scientific scholarship, such as your reading of Plato seems highly questionable.) If you overstate your case, when your book is printed, you will at best embarrass yourselves, and at worst misinform the public.
Comment by Rick — 2 April 2006 @ 9:33 PM
I’ll readily confess that I don’t know ancient Greek; I’ve only read the Symposium in English translation, and while Plato did emphasize loving young boys for their intellect moreso than for their physical charms, there were long portions of the text that discussed sexual relations. Now, perhaps that’s all a translation error, but I think that would mean that some half the book was translated in such a way as to have no relation to the original text, and I find that unlikely.
WHAT? Are you and I reading the same Plato? It’s even in Wikipedia, under “Platonic love”:
I’m beginning to doubt whether or not you’ve actually read the Symposium….
But … that’s where I got this from …. I don’t really make much of a study of Greek history myself. I got this from Classicists at the University of Pittsburgh, and what journals I have read on it. I’ve never found any mention of the Symposium of anti-gay, aside from your comment here. I can’t even find much corroborating evidence for you now. If that is indeed the consensus, it must be a very quiet one indeed. When I recieved the Brackenridge Fellowship to author a book on post-Roman Britain, one of my colleagues was working with Plato. The idea that the Symposium was anti-gay was never even entertained.
Plato did speak out very strongly about the unnatural phenomenon of sex between two adult males, but this only underlines the differences between Greek and modern society. In Classical society, sex was an act of penetration by a social superior, against a social inferior. The only thing that was really forbidden was sex between equals. That you find Plato railing against at length. But young boys, having a lower status, were considered quite desirable: not least of which by Plato himself.
Actually, in the published version, this thesis has been dropped entirely.
Biological Exuberance, by Bruce Bagemihl. Something like 1,000 pages documenting homosexual behavior throughout the animal kingdom. Just to name the richest and most easily available compilation of the evidence; in all, it’s far too plentiful to document here.
I don’t doubt it. Bagemihl provides no new research; he merely compiles the research of others into a single volume. Very useful for those of us who are not specialists in the field. You should take a look at the citations for his bibliography, not for a volume geared towards popular, rather than academic, audiences.
Quite true. For specific behaviors in specific species, I’ve seen ratios for everything from 3% to 27%, but the mode has generally been around 10%. It keeps popping up–in humans, in sheep, in primates, all over the place. I don’t know of any single study that’s collated all of that data, but from the reading I’ve done on homosexuality in non-human animals, 10% is a recurring number, and it’s a number that makes evolutionary sense. In artificial selection, we know that a random 10% culling improves the herd. A roughly similar appearance of homosexuality could produce a similar effect. In short, if an animal species didn’t have 10% of its population as homosexuals, it would either very quickly do so, or it would be out-competed byt those that did, and go extinct.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 3 April 2006 @ 12:03 PM
I got this from Classicists at the University of Pittsburgh, and what journals I have read on it.
Well, that narrows the field. U.Pitt has a pretty small Classics department. If you have any names or publication titles, that would help.
Comment by Rick — 4 April 2006 @ 7:48 PM
Oi … that was a long time ago….
Comment by Jason Godesky — 4 April 2006 @ 9:49 PM
WHAT? Are you and I reading the same Plato? It’s even in Wikipedia, under “Platonic love”:
You and I seem to operate from very different semantic contexts, to the point where we are frequently in danger of talking past each other. For example, the Catholic Church demands absolute chastity from homosexuals. It is commonly called anti-gay. If I understand Plato correctly, he would similarly demand utter chastity if it were possible in Athens. Thus the Christian reading of Plato is commonly called an anti-gay reading of Plato — which does not prove that Plato *was* anti-gay — or even that we can arrive at a common understanding of what it means to be “anti-gay” or “pro-chastity.”
I don’t regard wikipedia as a scholarly source (its conflation of Ficino and Plato is shocking), nor do I regard J. Addington Symonds as anything other than a propagandist.
The wikipedia entry cited mentions “chaste pederasty” — which seems awfully close to a contradiction in terms. If a relationship is intentionally chaste, it fails *my* definition of pederasty.
However, the wikipedia does reference a far more restrained work:
http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk/Volume4Articles/PlatoTheoryOfLove.htm
That has the kind of careful language I would call scholarly.
There are many difficulties in Plato’s theory of love: there is an ambivalent attitude towards sex that seems to be inherent in Plato’s thought; there are some contradictions in his attitude towards homosexuality, and of course, his attitude towards women is utterly problematic. Interesting as these issues might be, I shall not address them here. Rather, I shall concentrate on the relationship between rationality and emotion in Plato’s theory of love.
Two possible interpretations of this issue seem to me worth mentioning: one is that Plato’s highest love is predominantly intellectual, possibly fervent but always a form of rational activity.
Amir’s cited language is restrained: wikipedia’s is not. Amir admits the possibility of different interpretations: wikipedia seems to be an advocacy piece.
Comment by Rick — 4 April 2006 @ 10:05 PM
What we mean by “gay” is a very different thing from what Plato was talking about. Plato very harshly condemned sexual activity between two consenting, male adults, as a crime against nature. He was apparently a big fan of older men bedding younger boys. From our perspective, this looks like a contradiciton, but not from the Classical perspective, where sex had less to do with gender, and more to do with the assertion of dominance.
Nature does. I consider it on par with any other encyclopedia–that is, at best, a starting point.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 4 April 2006 @ 10:16 PM
Plato very harshly condemned sexual activity between two consenting, male adults, as a crime against nature. He was apparently a big fan of older men bedding younger boys. From our perspective, this looks like a contradiciton, but not from the Classical perspective, where sex had less to do with gender, and more to do with the assertion of dominance.
According to Jessica Moss of the U.Pitt Classics Department, Plato was against actual sex between those older men and younger boys.
Comment by Rick — 6 April 2006 @ 7:50 AM
Moss, yes, I remember hearing her in some arguments with others on this topic. I don’t remember her being terribly convincing, though….
Then again, I spent most of my time in the anthropology department in those days. This really is a long sidetrack on a meaningless, throw-away bit of supporting evidence, after all. I could refer to sex with young boys in ancient Greece in general and still have my bit of supporting evidence on quite solid ground.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 6 April 2006 @ 9:11 AM
As this is my first post, thank you, Jason, for your fascinating insights.
Couple of nits.
First, life seems to have evolved from the “baseline” (prokaryotic bacteria) to simpler (e.g., viral) as well as more complex forms. I think this strengthens your argument.
Secondly, as I understand (perhaps wrongly) “no two atoms alike” has not been established. You could argue that any two atoms of the same isomer differ in position and velocity, but the point would lose its meaning.
Thanks again.
Comment by John Tobey — 13 December 2006 @ 1:47 PM
Welcome to the Anthropik Network, John. I’d always thought virii predated bacteria, but you may well be correct. As far as “no two atoms alike,” while any two similar isotopes will have the same number of neutrons, electrons, and protons, there’s still variation that cannot be duplicated: for instance, where any given electron is in that electron cloud. I hear some physicists are wondering if the electron is really a “thing” at all, or if it might be more of a probability.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 13 December 2006 @ 2:41 PM
Long time no write. I still don’t like extending this argument to atoms. It is one thing to say that identical twins differ in their fingerprints, and another to say they differ because one is sitting and the other standing. The energy state of a bound electron is in the latter category, I think. And “position within the cloud” is not really meaningful. The electron is simultaneously everywhere in the probability cloud until you observe it. This is my admittedly lay understanding.
The argument works fine down to the cellular level. Even large DNA molecules, I would bet, always differ, if only by a few isotopes. No need to push it to the atomic scale, unless of course you can cite a reference.
Comment by John Tobey — 18 January 2007 @ 4:21 PM
Jason, very very interesting stuff. Having read through to about halfway in the comments:
Pedophilia: let us not forget that our own culture is absolutely drowning in the heterosexual version. For example in a number of states including Texas, the age of consent to marriage is 14, with approval of the parents. Thus a rich old pedophile finds some 14-year-old girl on the poor side of town, bribes the parents with promises of sharing the wealth, and makes off with the kid; when she turns 18, he dumps her, pays off her and her family, and goes for the second round with some other 14-year-old girl. The fact that it can happen means that it necessarily does happen, or at least that it is permissible under the prevailing morality. See also the absolutely huge number of popular songs involving an older man singing love-verses (more aptly, lust-verses) toward a hypothetical girl child: “You’re sixteen, you’re beautiful, and you’re mine,” and “she was only sixteen, you know what I mean,” and all the rest of that kind of garbage, across a number of musical genres. (Lately we even see the trend in certain sectors of popular music to glorify overt rape.) Etc. etc., on ad-nauseam.
Murder: Very insightful to disentangle the verb “to do” from the verb “to be” in this instance. Our culture is saturated with do/be conflations, most obviously in the use of occupational titles as statements of identity (e.g. “I am a telephone switching systems engineer,” yes I’m guilty of this one too). But the more emotionally charged the doing-action, the more difficult to disentangle from the state-of-being, as with murder. You caught that one, which most people including myself have let pass. And doing so is not the same as minimizing the gravity of the crime of murder (as would go the typical counterclaim in such cases, e.g. where someone is accused of being soft on crime). The gravity of the crime remains; the identity of the person is not identical with the deed.
Re. Kant: his two axioms were a) treat people as ends-in-themselves rather than as means to other ends, and b) act only in accord with principles that you would hold as universal. Of these the first is the more arbitrary, in the sense that it derives from something other than the rigorous application of logic in and of itself. I have some ideas about this which I’ll be publishing on my own site when the site is up. But in any case, (b) is supportable from logic without need of recourse to other preceding principles (i.e. “consistency of rules” is a subset of “logical consistency generally”). And back to the first point, it is certainly consistent with the neotribal ethic, or at minimum inconsistent with the “economic man” ethic of both capitalism and Marxism where humans are always turned into commodities i.e. means to other ends.
OK this posting is getting too long as per my custom or bad habit as it may be:-). ’til next -
-G
Comment by gg3 — 25 January 2007 @ 10:52 AM
Having read the rest of the comments here:
I get the impression that some of the criticism is splitting hairs and even picking nits (eww).
For example, to take the issue of diversity down to the question of positions of electrons, is a reductio-ad-absurdum. Same case with ennumerating seven generations in terms of a precise number of years. First, the definition of generation in terms of number of years varies. Second, taking the phrase in its symbolic meaning enhances its meaningfulness and effective usefulness: as with “the spirit of the law” vs. “the letter of the law.”
For a few years I’ve been working on some essays exploring questions that include the foundations of ethics. I’m in the process of setting up my own website where this stuff will be published, and this should occur fairly soon, so I’ll refrain from posting a bunch of it here. Some of my ideas may be useful to you in areas such as the is/ought question and the issue of foundational values complimentary to the value of diversity.
(A friend is on the phone, I have to scoot…)
Comment by gg3 — 27 January 2007 @ 12:25 AM
Jason,
I deeply appreciate your effort to help us recapture the now lost depth and richness of our social lives with diversity.
Diversity of experience makes us socially stronger and less insecure, and thus freer and more open in our relationships.
Such fearless freedom is essential before we can ever regain our lost existential state of nature.
Diversity, however, is beyond good and evil.
Diversity’s utility has a reality to each and every one of us that is too real to be justified or even enforced by such moral dictate.
We know that Diversity’s greatest utility is that it WORKS!
Good and evil are unnecessary fictions embellishing and even fetishizing utilitarian fact.
Those who need to fetishize a utility with moral value constructs are NOT true believers, and are always the first to betray their feigned belief, and deny the utility of that which they have never truely experienced.
Diversity need only to be truely experienced for its utility to be believed.
Comment by hoodie — 3 March 2007 @ 3:49 AM