Thesis #10: Emergent elites led the Agricultural Revolution.
by Jason GodeskyHow the Agricultural Revolution happened is well understood. It is perhaps best explained by David Rindos’ Selectionist Hypothesis, which Jared Diamond explained succinctly in Guns, Germs and Steel as a specific case of co-evolution. We could domesticate large herd mammals by identifying the leader; we could domesticate cereal grains because they were prone to harvesting. In the wild, a pea pod that doesn’t explode will simply die off, but to a human gatherer, such a pod filled with delicious peas is much more desirable than picking individual peas off the ground. Even without conscious management, simply dropping a few peas by accident will leave even more of the mutant non-exploding pea plants near the traditional camp site when the band returns next year. Followed over centuries, this process will eventually create non-toxic almonds, turn aurochs into cows, and give rise to domesticated forms of wild organisms bred to better serve human interests. How this all happened is not the question. The question is why.
Theories of why the Agricultural Revolution happened have traditionally been divided between “push” and “pull” theories. Childe’s “Oasis Hypothesis,” Braidwood’s Natural Habitat Hypothesis and the Population Pressure Hypothesis are all examples of “push” theories, where something forces a population into agriculture. Most “push” theories make no attempt to answer why agriculture was adopted, only how. Both Childe’s Oasis Hypothesis and Braidwood’s Natural Habitat Hypothesis explain how agriculture might have been made possible, but neither even attempts to explain why it happened. For both, “why” is an absurd question; the superiority of agriculture should be self-evident. As we have already seen, though, this is a severely flawed assumption.
By far, however, the Population Pressure Hypothesis is the most important of the push models. It is nearly taken for granted in many circles. The hypothesis states that agriculture had to be adopted because of rising populations through the Mesolithic. Yet, for any given grain of wheat, there is a decision to be made. One can either eat it, or plant it, but never both. Planting wheat is an investment of food; it’s sacrificing food now, in order to have more food in the future. Investment is not an activity engaged in by people lacking resources; it’s something only people with resources to spare indulge in. Poor people aren’t very big in the stock market, and starving people who buried all their rice would never survive long enough to reap the harvest. We take it nearly without argument that the Neolithic began with increasing, hungry populations, but there are two questions left unanswered:
- Since human population is a function of food supply, where did this population come from? and
- Why did starving populations bury their wheat, instead of eat it?
Human populations, like all animal populations, are controlled by food supply, so what made those populations begin to grow in the first place? As the first foragers began to experiment with horticulture, the structural barriers against agriculture would have disappeared, and a gradual slide into agriculture would have begun. Yet there remains a pivotal moment here, as well: when those first foragers settled down in horticultural villages, and decided that from now on they would grow their food in gardens (and hunt to supplement), instead of hunting for it (and gardening to supplement)–a huge difference.
By contrast to “push” scenarios, “pull” models discuss factors which enticed populations and pulled them into agriculture. The Selectionist Hypothesis mentioned above is the most widely accepted of these models, where co-evolution “pulled” human societies towards agriculture by providing domesticates. Of course, this cannot be the full story. The availability of domesticates hardly demands such gross inefficiency in their harvesting, and though no species evolves in a vaccuum, not many squirrels are known for their agricultural techniques.
Perhaps the most compelling of all these theories, though, is a “pull” model: Bender & Hayden’s Social Hypothesis. In this hypothesis, food production is taken up in all its deadly earnest to generate the surpluses required by “Big Men” for competitive feasting.
The term “Big Man�? was first used in Melanesia (Van Bakel et al, 1986), where it was used to describe leaders who could not accurately be described as “chiefs,�? as they lacked any ascribed position. While sometimes denounced as a vacuous term when applied outside the realm of Melanesian ethnography, it is nonetheless often used of a type of leader, who gains prestige—and with it, influence—not through ascribed political institutions, but through achieved status. “Big Men�? rarely control material resources, so much as social ones. Their prestige gives them great influence over others, but they cannot enforce their will. Rather, “Big Men�? primarily spend their time trying to convince, cajole, and persuade their followers to intensify production. (Harris, 1993) The essential function of most “Big Men” is as competitors for prestigate in an ever-escalating, high stakes game of competitive feasting. Typified by the Kwakuitl potlatch or the New Guinea moka, it is from these extravagant displays of generosity that “Big Men�? derive their prestige, and thus, their power. Through an elaborate system of loans, “Big Men�? are able to collect large amounts of food together at a single time for competitive feasting. New Guinea Big Men, for example, could never raise a sufficient number of pigs for an acceptable moka. They do keep significant herds of their own, but they constantly lend those pigs to others, as well as lending their time and labor. Then, when the time comes for a moka, they collect on all of those debts at once, amassing an amount of resources they never could have gathered themselves. In this way, “Big Men�? use generosity and gratitude to co-opt an entire community for their own purposes.
Rather than accumulating wealth, “Big Men�? might rather be seen as a conduit of wealth, as the “Big Man” economy becomes, essentially, redistributive. Wealth is extracted by them from their followers, and flows quickly out from them to the population as a whole. This is essentially the same economy which chiefdoms formalize. The primary activity of the “Big Man�? is increasing the intensity of production, in order to create a surplus of food which can be distributed for competitive feasting. (Harris, 1993) This is precisely what occurred in the Agricultural Revolution. Hayden & Bender have argued that competition between groups is fiercest in periods of scarcity or abundance, but especially so in a period of abundance which follows a period of scarcity.
This is precisely what occurred at the beginning of the Neolithic, with the end of the Pleistocene. The chaos of the Younger Dryas created alternating seasons of famine and plenty, and such inter-group competition can act as a form of insurance against periodic shortfall of resources. Famines are characteristic of agriculture, not foragers; but there is evidence for inclement conditions at the time of the Agricultural Revolution. It is doubtful these conditions would have led to famines—we know of no foraging group to have ever faced such conditions, archaeological evidence for widespread malnutrition before the rise of agriculture is generally lacking, and even a desert like the Kalahari can be abundant for a forager—however we can easily imagine a scenario of periods of less prosperity than usual. This would have been precisely the conditions to foster competitive feasting.
Generally, neighboring groups are invited to the lavish feasts the “Big Men�? provide. The shame of being so outdone requires the other group to reciprocate in a few years’ time. This can be seen as somewhat like the foragers’ sharing within the group, only on a larger scale. When one group is fortunate enough to have a surplus, they share it in these competitive feasts—albeit for self gain—with those who might not be so well-off. In time, when the situation is reversed, they may be treated to such a feast—out of vengeance, for those giving it. The competitive nature of this feasting gives it a self-serving motivation, so that it does not rely on such a shaky foundation as altruism. With personal motivation, this system could have greatly aided the survival of forager groups facing the inclement conditions of the early Holocene. With this new emphasis on competitive feasting, the prominence of the “Big Man�? would have increased accordingly. As an adaptation to inclement climate, “Big Men�? rose to power, and required ever larger surpluses to maintain that power. Every feast must be larger than the last one; one’s rival must provide a larger feast than you did, which obliges you to provide an even larger feast than that. The only resource “Big Men�? could truly control was labor, and that only through persuasion. The natural response of “Big Men�? to this sort of pressure would be to intensify cultivation—that is, to begin practicing agriculture.
As mentioned above, the prototype of the chiefdom-level redistributive economy can easily be recognized in the swift flow of wealth through the “Big Man.�? Why, though, would egalitarian groups allow “Big Men�? to solidify their power, so as to develop ascribed institutions? The usual forager response to individuals grabbing for power is fission of the group—the unsatisfied dissidents simply leave. However, where there are significant, immobile resources, this may not be possible. (Gilman, 1981) Surprisingly, recent archaeological discoveries have revealed that, contrary to usual thinking, sedentism preceded agriculture. Most likely, an increasing reliance on cereal grains required the use of large, immobile processing units. With such stationary assets, villages would develop, as the group could no longer easily move about. (Harris, 1993) This is precisely the sort of situation Gilman describes (1981) for how “Big Men�? might be able to attain ascribed position for themselves and exert their dominance.
Such pre-agricultural villages may also help to explain the nutritional crisis faced by these groups. Famine still seems unlikely, as reliance on cereal grains would most likely not have occurred, and the groups have simply moved elsewhere, had they not been able to support a relatively sedentary foraging population in the first place. However, periodic shortfall would most likely have been a rather common occurrence. Trade, like competitive feasting, can be a sort of insurance against such shortfalls (Hirth, 1992; Gilman, 1981). Here, again, the primary figures are the elites. The trade in question is primarily of elite goods, conducted between elites of different groups. In so doing, fledgling elites extend the social network under their influence over a much wider area than their own group. While aiding in the nutrition and survival of their group, it also serves to reinforce the primacy of the elite. And, with significant investments of labor, time and resources into a specific location, simply leaving an area may not be a viable means of dealing with a power-hungry despot. Do you up and leave the land your family has farmed for generations, simply because the village headman wants his son to succeed him?
It has been argued that the chiefdom is a transitional form, which ultimately becomes a state. (Kottak, 2000) However, its relation to the “Big Man�? systems found in egalitarian societies should also be fairly obvious. The transition from egalitarian society to state-level society should be fairly easy to see here. It is a transition driven primarily by competitive feasting, leading to the need for greater intensity in cultivation, the need for a surplus, the inability to meet those needs by transhumance, and the resulting elites who arise from those factors.
The most complex, hierarchical political structure is the state; “civilization�? is, in anthropological terms, synonymous with that level of society. Even in archaic states, the primary asset of the political structure was not material, but social (Hirth, 1992). The state controlled human labor, and material goods indirectly through that medium. Civilization rests heavily on specialization: specialists in crafts, specialists in religion, specialists in defense, even specialists in bureaucracy—the elites themselves. These specialists are supported by the surplus of agriculture; without agriculture, civilization could not exist. It is the foundation, the absolute minimum prerequisite of state-level society. Another possible explanation for agriculture is that the surpluses were needed to feed specialists, such as artisans. Of course, the need for artisans would only arise from trade. If trade became the primary means of safeguarding against starvation, artisans may become important in order to produce goods to be traded. Once again, it is an elite activity—trade—which drives agriculture. In many formulations of the Social Hypothesis, it is trade specifically which is cited as the cause of agriculture: a society must have extensive trade networks, and the elites required to administrate them, as a prerequisite to agriculture.
We have archaeological attestation of sedentary foragers in the Middle East and Mesoamerica just prior to the inception of agriculture (Harris, 1993). These forager villages were most likely created because of the large mills and other equipment required to extract food from cereal grains. With these stationary assets, the ability of the foragers to move was reduced, and permanent housing was developed at the site. At first, this did not interfere with foraging as their subsistence base. (Harris, 1993)
With the end of the Pleistocene, conditions became warmer and drier in general (Harris, 1993). This change in climate may have made the foraging lifestyle of these village-dwellers more difficult to maintain, with periodic hunger becoming more and more common. Two mechanisms for dealing with this have been discussed: competitive feasting, and trade. Both operate as safeguards by indebting neighboring groups or otherwise expanding social influence beyond the local group. Both also require elites—“Big Men�? and/or chiefs—to administrate. Both require the production of a surplus. Elites need ever larger surpluses to maintain their power in the ever-escalating cycle of competitive feasting, and the artisans employed by the elites require food to create goods for trade. Both activities create and solidify elite dominance, and both require a surplus. None of the other hypotheses examined adequately explain why such a surplus would be desirable, as a surplus is, by definition, unnecessary, and as we have seen, the costs of agriculture are sufficiently high to demand a very good reason for the desirability of such a surplus. In this scenario, two closely interrelated factors—the dominance of the elites and the food security of the group—demand this surplus.
The primary ability of “Big Men�? is to intensify production. The selectionist argument assures us that at least semi-domesticated plants were already available from the local environment, due to millennia of evolutionary interaction. Furthermore, active intervention to favor the regrowth of favored crops is not unknown among foragers. More intensive work may well have been a high priority of “Big Men�? in the area. Whereas agriculture would be a terrible idea for an overly-large population, or a group otherwise facing frank malnutrition, such an investment of food for the future would be quite reasonable for a group in the midst of a temporary time of plenty—particularly when inclement conditions assured such prosperity would not last.
With agricultural intensification, the investment placed into a specific geographic location increased drastically. Already sedentary due to the immobility of the processing equipment an emphasis on cereal grains required, the Agricultural Revolution required the clearing of fields, irrigation, terracing, and other large initial investments of labor that made simply moving away a difficult prospect. This changed the dynamics of human politics; whereas the primary means foragers use of settling disputes is to simply go somewhere else, this was no longer an option. The difficulty of group fission allowed “Big Men�? to become chiefs with permanent, ascribed position and title (Gilman, 1981).
War, rather than being a strategy for maintaining the peace, became a tool for economic expansion (Godesky, 2000), leading directly to the intensification of conflict found among agricultural societies (Eckhardt, 1992; Harris, 1993). Further bolstered by
intensified conflict, elites became administrators of defense as well (Gilman, 1981), and were able to create permanent power structures for themselves. Without recourse to group fission due to the huge investments placed into the specific region, groups had no choice but to capitulate to the rulers thus created.
Transporting food over significant distances was generally difficult in the ancient world. The Roman Empire exercised sufficient control to feed the Eastern Empire with grain from Egypt, and the West from Britain, but this was a feat of administrative and logistical prowess which even the Romans could not sustain forever. Their inability to continue such Herculean feats was one of the primary reasons for the end of the Western Empire.
More generally, one had to be relatively close to one’s food. Every city was surrounded by a hinterland that fed that city; this was the ancient city-state, whether that city-state be Greek or Teotihuacani. The Roman Empire itself was primarily a patch-work of various civitates, or city-states, that paid tribute to the central city of Rome–the perfect model of inter-community trade, so far as any one community might be concerned.
As Hirth points out, every agricultural society faces a dilemna of whether to specialize to create a greater surplus, or diversify to offset the danger of a bad harvest. It is a classic dilemna in economics, and the classic answer has always been trade; I specialize in A, you specialize in B, and if we trade, then we can both have more of A and B.
But trading food was difficult. Most foods spoil, so they can’t be taken very far. They’re heavy, and the profits are not usually very high. It is generally more economical to trade light-weight, expensive luxury items. We have significant evidence that, prior to the Neolithic Revolution, trans-continental trade of lightweight luxury items occurred both in North America and Europe, if not elsewhere.
But if trading food is difficult, why does trade help anything? Because trading food is difficult–not impossible. The trade of luxury items and prestige goods helped create a marked upper-class: those who controlled this exotic trade with other groups. These would be the same “Big Men” who emerged in competitive feasting. Such goods helped demarcate their power and status, and were major assets in reinforcing their power. Like the kings of medieval Europe who would universally condemn peasant revolts, even against their enemies, the Big Men knew when to stick together. They needed one another for the trade on which their power and position relied, and if one of their primary trading partners fell on hard times, they could marshal their resources to rescue their ailing neighbors in the most ancient form of foreign aid.
So we have a clearer picture of the late Mesolithic coming together. The end of the Pleistocene fluctuates the climate, alternating between times of plenty and times of want. While starvation is rare and it would be a stretch to call the bad times “famine,” some years are undeniably harder than others.
In such uncertain times, “Big Men” emerge, providing some level of stability. In fat years, their lavish potlatches and mokas increase their own prestige and indebt neighboring groups–providing insurance against the hard years that will follow. These Big Men further bolster their position within the group, and cultivate a reciprocity network beyond the group, by using their power and influence to engage in long-distance trade. As a last resort, when all other possibilities are gone, they can call on neighboring Big Men to provide food.
These late Mesolithic foragers spend more and more time cultivating at more intensive levels, to produce enough food for the escalating competition of the Big Men’s feasts. It is hard, and they must sacrifice the freedom and liesure of their former life, but at least they have some security. Eventually, those Big Men have sufficient influence to make their followers stop thinking of themselves as hunters who farm, and begin thinking of themselves as farmers who hunt.
Big Men become chiefs, chiefs become kings, populations explode and civilization moves inexorably from that beginning to the present crisis.
In the years since 9/11, a quote from Benjamin Franklin has enjoyed renewed popularity in certain circles: “They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” The loss of civil liberties and freedoms suffered by the United States’ citizenry under the second Bush regime, though significant, remain small when compared to the freedoms lost 10,000 years ago when our forebears (memetically, if not genetically) took up civilization. Agriculture is a hard life, as we have already seen. Malnutrition and disease followed almost immediately; war, tyranny and poverty followed inexorably. By relying solely on domesticated crops, intensive agriculture becomes the only subsistence technology that is truly susceptible to real famine. The safety the Big Men offered was illusory; in fact, that ancient bargain put us in a more precarious position than we had ever known–or will likely ever know again.
Ten thousand years ago, our ancestors traded the bulk of that very real freedom that is our species’ birthright, for a little temporary safety. If there is an original sin, a fall of man, that was it. From that day to this, we have not deserved–nor have we had–either one.
Bibliography
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- 1992. Civilizations, empires and wars: a quantitative history of war. New York: McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Gilman, A.
- 1981 “The development of social stratification” Anthropology 22(1) pp. 1-23
- Harris, M.
- 1993. Culture, people, nature: an introduction to general anthropology, 6th edition. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
- Godesky, J.
- 2000. “War and Society.�? Published online: http://media.anthropik.com/pdf/godesky2000.pdf
- Hirth, K.
- 1992. “Interregional exchange as elite behavior: an evolutionary perspective.” In: Chase, D.Z. and Chase, A.F., Mesoamerican elites: an archaeological assessment. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kottak, C.
- 2000. Cultural anthropology, 8th edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Van Bakel, M., Hagesteijn, R. and Van de Velde, P.
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It would have been fascinating to see whether or not potlaching, big-men utilizing, sedentary societies NOT dependent on agriculture (such as the Chinook) would have developed an elite.
The Chinook relied almost exclusively on the unbelievable fertility of the Vancouver/Pacific Northwest, foraging and hunting almost exclusively, with very little horticulture and no known agriculture. While their culture DID utilize Big Men (I use the word utilize intentionally) and held frequent potlaches, they never developed an elite.
Three options: either the incredible abundance of the area prevented this, the lack of agriculture prevented the centralization of power through lack of surpluses, or the very model of big-men leading to entrenched elites does not apply to the Chinook situation in some other way.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 11 October 2005 @ 3:57 PM
The Kwakiutl were just such a potlatching, big-man utilizing, sedentary society … and they had elites–they had a full blown chiefdom, in some ways even worse than our own states.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 11 October 2005 @ 5:17 PM
The Chinook are not part of the Kwakiutl group. Related, inhabited some of the same areas, similar cultures, but not the same.
Kwakiutl: explained via this model.
Chinook: not explained. Perhaps not enough time had elapsed? They were a rather young group in the area.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 15 October 2005 @ 2:10 PM
Quite right, I certainly didn’t mean to indicate that the Chinook were Kwakiutl. I was responding to your original question, “It would have been fascinating to see whether or not potlaching, big-men utilizing, sedentary societies NOT dependent on agriculture (such as the Chinook) would have developed an elite.” The Kwakiutl are just such a “potlatching, big-men utilizing, sedentary society,” and they did develop an elite. Why they did, and the Chinook did not, is a question I’ll need to spend more time on.
As should’ve been indicated by the title, “Exceptions that Prove the Rule #1: The Iroquois” was the first of a series. #2 was always planned as the Kwakiutl (#3, Sungir). When I prepare that, I’ll definitely make a point to look into why there’s this disparity between the Kwakiutl and the Chinook.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 15 October 2005 @ 4:04 PM
Ah, my bad.
You know, I remember reading the title of Exceptions that Prove the Rule #1 and thinking, “It’s great that someone’s challenging the Leaver/Taker model!” This was mainly because I had done a great deal of research into the Pacific Northwest cultures, and from what I had learned, saw a huge problem with the neat little labels. But it’s been SO long since the last Exceptions (wink, wink) that I’d forgotten about them.
Sorry about the misunderstanding.
- Chuck
Comment by Chuck — 16 October 2005 @ 8:01 AM
Heh, many times agriculture is seen as the source of hierarchy. Without further explanation.
The explanation about agriculture and hierarchy here is very interesting. It would be interesting to find why there came such “Big Men” in power in certain tribes.
Maybe this is Murphy’s law: “Everything that can go wrong, goes wrong” ?
Comment by gunnix — 21 February 2006 @ 3:47 PM
Hmm. It seems to me that the idea of Big Men amassing large wealth and then giving it away while simultaneously indebting others, has present-day parallels.
This is not very well thought-out, but:
Social status maintained through wealth accumulation: check, commonplace.
Enormous wealth and redistribution: not quite so clear; we don’t have a universal redistributive system other than the generic market of goods and services. Perhaps the “holiday shopping season” provides a kind of faux-redistribution: “here is all this material wealth, now go buy whatever you want for yourself and kin.”
Indebtedness: check! We’ve reached the stage where on one hand nations are indebted to other nations, and on the other hand, the vast masses of individuals within specific nations are deep in personal debt toward their local “Big Men” abstracted as credit institutions.
Key question is, what to do about the tendency of some humans to use persuasion to accumulate social status? Seems to me that this is at the root of the most unchallengeable hierarchies, the purely social ones that appear to be “voluntary” but can be as destructive or more so than those that are explicit and subject to checks & balances.
I have never understood status-seeking as a motivation, except in the abstract. Why, aside from some atavism of our chimpanzee ancestors, would anyone even want to waste their time engaged in such behavior..? The only motive I can find plausible is overcompensation for insecurity. Another possibility is preferential access to mating partners, the old selfish genes acting up again. Or perhaps it’s simple neurophysiology: excess of testosterone.
Humans are weird…
Comment by gg3 — 29 January 2007 @ 4:44 AM
I find that most comments on my culture - Kwakwaka’wakw - and on many others are made as though the culture emerged full blown, has never waxed and waned.
To my mind, all cultures start in some enlightenment, use the enlightenment to live well together, lose original interpretation in the living of life’s design and environment, and in the jostling of cultures that happen over time when some cultures over-run others’ areas - particularly when they do so and then stay. We see in the “old world” where this has ocurred many times with florescence of creativity and atrify that follows. Aboriginal cultures are never seen as evolving, or having evolved, having been good for the participants, but they were and are.
The comments made regarding the potlatch only terms of Big Man building and indebtedness fall far short of understanding the institution. Boas opined as to it’s usefulness in Kwakwaka’wakw society - even the usefulness of the indebtedness, which lay on the Big Man and not very heavily on the witnesses who attended his ceremonies. It involved the entire community and the tribes that lived in related villages, and ensured that young Chiefs would remember important relatives who had underwritten his rise in responsibility - power yes, in some ways, but in responsibility far more so. The fact that potlatches fed people too, clothed people, gave them goods they were less likely to acquire otherwise, was important in the distribution of wealth. The wealth itself had little to do with anything in an environment that offered all that was needed to live.
One of Codere’s books makes it clear that Kwakwaka’wakw society lived in the best housing on the coast, made tools of such precision that excellence could be predicted in terms of what was made, and all things we produced, with the exception of daily clothing, which the white folk found on the plain side, we infused artistic flare to continue evolving from excellent function to higher skills.
In this section, it’s also made clear from correspondence between the Indian agent and his superiors, that we took to the paid work in the new economy in the late 19th century and early 20th century with great relish, not to participate in a new way of life, as was hoped by the agents, agencies and churches, but as a means of potlatching to our hearts’ content with more goods than would otherwise have been possible. It only makes sense that if one has never known hunger or lack of warmth in clothing or shelter, lack of family and history, that current important issues would benefit from new found ways of earning.
It’s no mystery in this light, that the potlatching became more and more elaborate, to the point that nonsense scholars created the “warring with potlatches” notion. It’s the purest of eyewash in view of the way things unfolded, which is there for any seeing eye to read. More was around by dint of european stuff like forts and ships and goods and guns, and there was no want to begin with - where else would gain go but into processes that had served us well?
The break in our knowledge of our history - not as critically broken as in many aboriginal cultures - is responsible for a great deal of confusion as to how to potlatch, and naturally, our being surrounded by the power culture bleeds materials and rationalizations into our ceremonies, our life decisions, our group discussions, our solutions for everything.
As to a Chief’s need to tell the family history and in so doing, sounding a little egomaniacal, well, they tell of the past in order to live today and look to the future. Frankly, some do it well, and are aware that they tell of highfaluting days and people so we all can be proud. Some just are not thinkers or speakers. Where do people like anthropologists get off summing up such people?
I do hope more thinking will go into the study of a folk that is alive and well and will be present in whatever current society becomes. We are effected by what is around us, we remember much of pre-contact culture, and we are moving toward being able to choose how to participate in that culture that “discovered” us. Potlatching is going to evolve with us, support our young families by indebting them to their elders in order that they and their new generations will have a longer view than for their own paltry lives. Get your heads out of your armpits and be a little humble and you might learn something about cultures that are not your own.
Comment by Carolyn — 7 October 2007 @ 10:29 PM
Are you familiar with the distinction between emic and etic perspectives? They offer very different points of view. Etically, potlatching was primarily a political activity along the Pacific Northwest coast. You’re talking about an emic perspective, as a member of that culture. That’s an invaluable perspective, but here, we’re talking about the structural, cultural materialist nature of the society—how it works, even from an ecological point of view. I’m afraid for that question, the emic perspective doesn’t tell us very much. Just as we’ve needed to step back and view the structures of our own civilization devoid of our mythology (our emic perspective), so, too, do we need to look at other cultures (like yours) emically, as well.
Comment by Jason Godesky — 8 October 2007 @ 7:04 PM
This is a complete off-topic question, and possibly answered somwhere else here, but it’s been dogging me as I’m going through the 30 theses one by one and haven’t seen it answered enywhere so far.
The question:
The problem with localized overpopulation only appears with agriculture. Before agriculture, in Forager societies, population is naturally kept at the level that local biota can sustain. So what is the actual mechanism that stops population from growing?
I believe that this is important, because if this mechanism is, as I imagine it to be, traumatic (i.e. higher child mortality), it will always incentivise to return to farming (as in:I don’t want any of my tribe’s children to die), as soon as soils rebuild.
So what is it?
Comment by Adam Wozniak — 25 April 2008 @ 4:27 PM
If it’s answered somewhere, just point me in the direction
Comment by Adam Wozniak — 25 April 2008 @ 4:28 PM
Adam,
Hopefully someone more authoritative can answer this for you, but my take is as follows.
The primary mechanism for controlling population growth is decreased fertility rates. There are several aspects of this decreased fertility. First, when food is scarce natural fertility declines. Secondly, in a nomadic and egalitarian society a woman’s control over reproduction (via, contraception/abortion as well as sexual availability) leads to more time between children as it is very difficult to take care of multiple young children at one time. (I believe the !Kung averaged 5+ years between children). In addition, acceptance of abortion/infanticide also lead to a controlled population.
A slight increase in infant mortality due to lack of modern medicine is possible, primarily among those children that are seriously premature or with congenital defects that require surgery.
It is unlikely that lack of food or modern medical care would cause a marked increase in mortality rates among any portion of the population.
None of these mechanisms would be viewed as particularly traumatic by the society in which they are practiced.
–
JimFive
Comment by JimFive — 28 April 2008 @ 9:40 AM
Thank you Jim. I was thinking about fertility decreased by hunger as a ’second option’ to higher mortality as it looks least conscious/controlled. I’ve heard of infanticide in aboriginal tribes of Taiwan, but then again, it seams to be a guilty secret of even the Polish vilages, that not every apearance of a bump in a village was followed by the apearance of a baby. How common was it, though?
I know that there are natural methods of contraception other than the vatican roulette, I would be interested in learning about them.
One thing though, about hunger induced infertility, it fails as soon as they start producing food (because they can control suply). and they will start producing food as soon as it becomes possible, because if we have this proclivity to see things as tools, whether they be a stick, a rock, or a sound, we will always come up with the idea that a plant is also a potential tool.and down the slippery slope we go.
So sooner or later you have to rely on the more conscious/controlled options and these only last untill someone changes their mind. After reading what I have read here and on other related pages, I think that we will always oscilate from HG to horticulture to farming and back.
I actually think i am more pessimistic than the guys here.
a)being a completly asocial type, I know I won’t survive.
b)I believe the collapse will be much slower then the guys here predict, which will allow the gobling up of remaining biodiversity (they ar’e now converting jungle into biofuels. at a push, with slash&burn they will convert the rest to food, leaving a dustbowl behind)untill all earth looks like mesopoamia, kalahari or a bleached greek island
c)This state will persist as long as there are humans, because whenever soils rebuild, farming will return.
Comment by Adam Wozniak — 28 April 2008 @ 3:40 PM
True and not true. Hungry people don’t become farmers. Being a farmer requires that you set aside a significant amount of food to be planted at a later date. Jason argues that agriculture will be impossible due to a combination of degraded soils and climate variability. I’m not completely convinced, but the argument is there.
Developing agriculture seems to me to require a certain amount of coincidence of opportunity. You need to have a sufficient surplus of food for enough years to allow for sendentism(*) to become established, enough warning of a decrease in supply of that food to allow for a transition to planting your own, and an environment that allows you to grow more than enough food for your group.
(*)The sendentism requirement is due to it being easier to just go find food somewhere else than to plant food here. The only reason to plant food here is because you want to stay here and the only reason to want to stay here is because you have created a bunch of stuff that is too annoying to move. It is important to note that even horticultural tribes that rely extensively on planted food move every 10-20 years or so.
I feel the same way about myself. I probably won’t survive, but I hope my children do.
Be cheered to know that even now, hunter gatherers live in the Kalahari.
I actual think this is less likely. By the time soils rebuild the remaining people will have become accustomed to a nomadic lifestyle. Until the aforementioned requirements converge agriculture won’t come into existance. And, without oil and ore it will remain limited in scope (near flood plains for example).
Comment by JimFive — 29 April 2008 @ 1:48 PM
The ability of degraded environment to sustain hunter-gatherers, while a slight comfort, doesn’t change a fact that you are dealing with a degraded environment. That is simply nothing to be cheerful about.
Also, I don’t accept the possibility of agriculture ever completely dissapearing, once it’s been discovered. ‘Fertile crescent’, mediterranean, for all degradation still support agriculture wherever it’s possible, and have continuously done so ever since it’s been introduced. Jason insist’s that if a land can sustain farmers, it can sustain foragers even better. So where are the mesopotamian foragers?
No.
Farming will always persist in pockets. Foragers will only be allowed where soils are too poor to sustain farming.
Whenever soils rebuild, the nearest agricultural holdouts will colonise and use them up.
Comment by Adam Wozniak — 29 April 2008 @ 2:17 PM
Hello,
Jason, in a brief post about “The Ten subsersive comandments” - at http://anthropik.com/2005/03/so-let-it-be-written/ -
you mention a paper you have written : “Asceticism as Political Resistance in Roman Judea, 6–66 CE,” [PDF].
In the post here, you also use one of your papers as reference :
Godesky, J.
2000. “War and Society.�? Published online: http://media.anthropik.com/pdf/godesky2000.pdf
Could you give a link to these papers ? It seems impossible to access them through the blog engine, in its current state of rusting…
You can also feel free to mail me the papers if you want - the system should have stored my email.
Subsidiary question : have you read Levy-Bruhl’s work ? Then what is your opinion about his work ? He is the father of modern French ethnography, if I am right, and wrote important essays about primitive thought.
Comment by Jean-Vivien Maurice — 22 June 2008 @ 10:33 AM
well,
Giuli, Jason, jhereg, jimfive, and all others whom I may be forgetting, when you are back from the wild… please dont forget my little lonely comment…
thanks, and what language is the word “sgeno” ?
Btw, sorry for not writing in e-prime, but I prefer general semantics…:-p see “10 objections to e-primitive”
http://learn-gs.org/library/etc/49-2-french.pdf
please dont discuss too much that last bit about e-prime, i dont want to start a troll here… :-p I am french anyway, so I would be more intereested in “F-prime” if there were such a thing… Our language has such a strong Latin & greek basis that it s even more categorical than English whihc is a lot more imaged. A simple example would be plant names : “Lapsana” becomes “Lampsane” for us and “Nipplewort” for you, “Marrubium” -> “Marrube” vs “Horseshoe”… But the Latin names are also imaged, like “Trifolium” which means “three-leaved” (clover in English, and trèfle in French)
Comment by Jean-Vivien Maurice — 6 July 2008 @ 5:18 PM
Jean-Vivien,
I hope that Jason gets the PDF files accessible again as well.
RE: F-Prime
My limited understanding of French leads me to believe that at least one class of statement that E-Prime is concerned with doesn’t occur in French. In English, one might say “I am a student”, but in French one would say “J’etudie” not “Je suis un etudiant”. So, at least in that case, there is no need to modify French. (Please feel free to correct my impressions of French, or, indeed, my spelling and grammar)
RE: the objections document:
My off the cuff rebuttal
10. More choice is not necessarily better. See: “The Paradox of Choice” by Barry Schwartz. Also note that the constraints required to write a Shakespearean sonnet lead to more inventiveness by the writer.
9. It seems that the author of the objections is using the term “general semantics” to mean more than is indicated. Isn’t any semantic practice part of “general semantics”.
8. Really, “He is a professor” and that is all, period, full stop, end of story?
7. Sometimes it is easier to dump out the container than to try and separate the salt from the sugar.
6. “The silly practice of E-prime continues” to what? A better formulation of the original sentence (”E-Prime is silly”) might be “I consider the practice of E-Prime silly.” And this displays the usefulness of E-Prime. In the first, silly is presented as an inherent basic fact of E-Prime, while in the second it is a judgement of the speaker and needs to be supported.
5,4,1. E-prime is a “rule of thumb” for eliminating the confusion and force of identity and predication statements. The fact that the goal is more subtle than E-prime takes in to account is irrelevant.
3,2 Pure speculation, “May have drawbacks” or it May not.
Overall: If I were a composition teacher I would probably give a couple of assignments in E-prime just to challenge my students. It is much easier to say “Do not use any form of the verb ‘to be’” than it is to say don’t use identity or predication.
Comment by JimFive — 7 July 2008 @ 8:21 AM
Jimfive,
your understanding of French is correct, and the remark hits the spot
Thanks for pointing it out
I didnt want to start a discussion on eprime, but if the arguments provided are not below this quality, I guess its alright. And honestly, I should have read more attentively the paper, because indeed it presents as many flaws itself as it highlights in e-prime… So point taken here
Which doesnt answer my question about “sgeno”, or about what people think of Levy Bruhl by this neck of the woods…
Comment by Jean-Vivien Maurice — 7 July 2008 @ 8:54 AM
Just a few more additions about French, since I find it interesting to compare which areas of my language are more or less “aristotelician” than English :
- in French, you say “J’ai soif” or “J’ai faim” (->”I have thirst/hunger”), while in English you d say “Iam thirsty/hungry”. I dont think the difference is that big, though.
- Nowadays you dont say “J’étudie”, but directly “Je suis étudiant” (-> “I am student”). Because studies have got longer and longer, so now its really an important stage of one’s life (and therefore you have an identity as a student… especially when it comes to train fares or movie tickets
). And you still say “Je suis médecin” or “Je suis architecte” (”I am physician/architect”). I’d guess not having an article in front of the noun denotes that we dont put so much emphasis on the social position as an identity, but I am not linguist…
- We have two auxiliary verbs : “être” et “avoir” (be/have). You use “être” for the passé composé of some verbs. Passé composé is a more or less intermediary tense in value between English preterit and present perfect, with the grammatical construct of the present perfect. These verbs are called “verbes d’état” (ie verbs that denote a state).
- On the other hand, we dont have the compound present (BE + ING), we use the simple present for the same value…
Comment by Jean-Vivien Maurice — 10 July 2008 @ 2:59 PM
At the risk of highjacking this into a discussion of French.
This is actually one of the things in French that I have a hard time with. You also say “Je suis fatigue”. I suspect that this is because there isn’t a convention for turning a noun into an adjective as there is in English.
English also uses forms of “to have” and “to be” as auxiliary verbs for tense formation. Usually “have” for past tense “I have studied french” and “be” for future tenses “I will be studying french” and some tenses use both, “I have been studying french” I don’t actually know the English name for this but it is a tense that indicates past action continuing into the present.
–
JimFive
Comment by JimFive — 14 July 2008 @ 8:38 AM
“Emergent elites led the Agricultural Revolution” - the title is good, and valid, but the actual exposition has little connection with the reality — it distorts indigenous ways and turns indigenous/tribal values on their heads.
This “Big Man” model (which sounds like a Marvin Harris hypothesis, so it doesn’t surprise me that Harris seems to be the main source) might have been worth mentioning as something that could conceivably have happened in certain places — but as THE model of the development of civilization it is like a tall tale that utterly misses.
And taking this story as THE path in which production surplus led to the the creation of hierarchy meant that no other path in which agriculture led to civilization is examined or even mentioned in this article — not even the simpler and more obvious paths.
I hope that some of these theses can be seriously re-examined before they are published in a book.
Comment by G. Highpine — 19 October 2008 @ 2:12 PM
While the “Big Man” hypothesis seems the most likely and valid, I would still hesitate as presenting it as the universal catalyst towards civilization. I don’t know that it can be absolutely verified. I think thoroughly exhausting alternate potential hypotheses (& more than 1 might’ve occurred) is important, and if we understand them well enough we can help prevent future civilizations from emerging.
One possible scenario is that a traumatized, charismatic individual sadistically maneuvers a band/tribe towards destructive ends, to compensate for feeling a lack of power / inferiority complex or PTSD. Ex: You are the survivor of an endemic plague where the rest of your community has been slain & you were then taken in by a new band/tribe, but psychologically damaged. You realize that grains and dairy contain the equivalent of opiates, and use them to gain power as an administrator of irrigation practices, trade, or distribution of surplus in cultivation, the agro-addiction initiates….etc.
Or, new religious practices or local customs could’ve been in effect, also due to charismatic leaders. (Seems like charisma and climate change are always the 2 most dangerous problems….) Not saying this/these happened, or that it is even likely, just that it is another potential explanation (that I just made up) that could account for some societies’ transitions.
Anyways, all of the scenarios deal with domestication and emerging classism, marking the rise of separationist/hierarchical thinking and relations instead of holistic/anarchic relations. Any sustainable band/tribe would need customs/mechanisms in place to prevent this, such as religious practices that respect non-humyns as equals, thus preventing domestication/cultivation, or taboos against grain-consumption, or shunning/exiling/insulting/healing those who seek to gain power, etc.
Comment by AutumnPhoenix — 24 December 2008 @ 1:19 AM
To Adam Wozniak, re: population sustainability -
I just purchased the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers (excellent!), which offers some insight into foragers’ reproductive capacities. Not only is the initial menstruation delayed until 16-18 because of diet & activity, but also the level of mobile activity performed by foraging womyn, as opposed to womyn’s sedentary home labor under agriculture, suppresses menstruation, similar to what is seen in certain female athletes. Womyn’s breastfeeding (which is longest in foraging societies) also suppresses menstruation, biologically. There’s also womyn’s control over their own bodies, herbal contraceptives & abortives, and infanticide (nomads can only care for or carry so many babies) that all help gatherer-hunters sustain their population levels, and I’m sure endemic illnesses do to as they lack antibiotics. I could probably find specific studies if you really need me to….
Comment by AutumnPhoenix — 24 December 2008 @ 1:20 AM